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I: Introduction 
 
This thesis will provide an original comparative analysis of the “Livre Vert de la Défense”, a 
French policy paper on environmental security published in February 2014. The book represents a 
response by the French section of the “Europe Ecologie les Verts” (EELV) political movement to the 
near complete neglect of environmental security issues in the “Livre Blanc de la Défense et la 
Sécurité Nationale”, made public by French President Hollande in April 2013. The aim of the French 
environmental party is to enhance the standing of environmental security in French and European 
strategic and military thinking by integrating the concept of a “green defence”. However, the “Livre 
Vert” attempts as much as possible to take a global approach to the threats and strategies it identifies, 
so the book has international applicability, especially since climate change represents a global risk. 
The objective of this thesis is to compare and contrast the “Livre Vert” to other policy papers and 
analyses from governments, think tanks or academia, in order to highlight both its strengths and 
weaknesses. This will involve answering three main research questions:  
1) How comprehensive are the security threats and the corresponding strategies identified by the 
“Livre Vert de la Défense”?  
2) Does the concept of a “green defence” fit into any conventional political categorization, or does it 
represent a new way of looking at international security?   
3) Does the “Livre Vert” offer a framework that is exhaustive enough to successfully address the 
potential for systemic crisis stemming from future environmental challenges? 
 
The project for a “Livre Vert de la Défense” was directed by EELV Senator Leila Aïchi, who 
is Secretary of the Defence Commission at the French Senate. The political context of the “Livre 
Vert” reveals both its strengths and weaknesses as a policy paper. Because it is responding to the 
absence of ecological issues in the “Livre Blanc”, it offers a comprehensive assessment of all the 
main environmental security threats. Moreover, in order to enhance the standing of environmental 
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issues in French and European strategic thinking, the “Livre Vert” underlines how various 
environmental risks interact and mutually reinforce one another, and presents them as primary threats 
and triggers. Likewise, because the EELV movement is both locally established and transnational 
across the EU, the strategies outlined in the “Livre Vert” are comprehensive because they are multi-
level. Policies are proposed at the local, national, European and international levels, and often go 
much further than other policy papers on the topic. However, because Senator Aïchi’s political 
commitments concentrate on defence and military issues due to her leadership role in the Senate 
Defence Commission, the focus of the “Livre Vert” tends to be rather narrow. The environmental 
threats are analysed from a “hard security” perspective that prioritizes their potential to trigger 
conflict, and there is a neglect of “soft security”, or the equally significant economic and social 
impact of environmental degradation. Likewise, the strategies that are proposed focus on a “high 
politics” approach that prioritizes adaptation to environmental threats by creating new military and 
governance structures, while neglecting “low politics” strategies of mitigation involving sustainable 
development policies.  
The distinction between “hard” and “soft” security has its origin in the broadening of the 
notion of “security” at the end of the Cold War. This was linked to the fact that traditional theories of 
international relations had proved wholly inadequate to anticipate and explain the collapse of the 
USSR; the realist approach, in particular, had explicitly claimed this to be part of its intellectual 
ambit. The subsequent discrediting of traditional approaches to international relations opened the 
possibility for scholars such as Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (founders of the 
“Copenhagen School”) to expand the concept of security beyond the military and state-centric realist 
approach to include individual, social and environmental security.1 Their work helped to establish a 
now classic distinction between “hard security”, seen to represent the traditional realist focus on 
macro level military threats to national and international security, and “soft security”, understood as 
referring to economic, social and environmental threats at both the macro and micro level. The 																																								 																					
1 Buzan B., Waever O. and de Wilde J. (1997), Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers 
Press.  
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originality of the “Livre Vert” is to analyse environmental issues from a “hard security” perspective, 
focusing on their potential to trigger civil and inter-state conflict at the macro level.   
A further classical distinction has been made between “high” and “low” politics, as conceived 
by Hans Morgenthau, one of the leading international relations theorists of the 20th century and an 
outstanding figure of the realist school:  
The interaction of sovereign entities (high politics) commands the leader’s agenda while state-
market relationships (low politics) are merely means to high political ends.2   
 
“High politics” is usually seen to represent the domain of war and peace, which covers matters that 
are vital to the very survival of the state. By contrast, “low politics” refers to all other matters that are 
not absolutely vital to the survival of the state, including economic and social issues. This classical 
distinction has come under strong criticism since the end of the Cold War. The possibility of war 
between the world’s main powers appears to have receded, and “low politics” economic and social 
matters linked to globalization are now seen to have a direct impact on the “high politics” of national 
and international security.3 This thesis will attempt to demonstrate that environmental security offers 
another example of why the classical distinction is inappropriate. Climate change has the potential to 
become a systemic crisis precisely due to the interaction and interdependence between “high 
politics” matters of war and peace together with “low politics” economic and social issues. Hence, a 
holistic approach is required both for analysing environmental threats and risks, as well as the 
corresponding policies and strategies to address them.   
 While they share many similarities, “soft security” is not the same thing as “low politics”, and 
“hard security” must be distinguished from “high politics”. The concept of “hard” and “soft” security 
relates to an analysis of threats and risks at the individual, local and global level. By contrast, the 
notions of “high” and “low” politics are much broader and constitute an overarching domain of 
politics, which includes both an analysis of threats and risks together with the corresponding policies 																																								 																					
2 Morgenthau H. J. (1958), Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York:  
Knopf Press. 
3 Ripsman N. M. (2006), False Dichotomies: Why Economics is High Politics, Political Science Department, Concordia 
University.  
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and strategies to address them. Therefore, while they must be distinguished, both concepts are in fact 
complementary and mutually reinforcing, as they represent two sides of the same coin. “High 
politics” is the domain of war and peace, which comprises an analysis of “hard security” risks 
together with the corresponding strategies to address them. “Low politics” encompasses everything 
traditionally not considered as absolutely vital to the survival of the state, which includes an analysis 
of “soft security” threats and the corresponding strategies to address them.  
 This thesis will aim to test the validity of the three following groups of hypotheses by 
adopting a holistic approach to environmental security:  
1) A) The security threats and risks identified in the “Livre Vert” present a paradox. On the one 
hand, the analysis is comprehensive as it examines in detail all the main environmental security 
issues and presents them as primary threats, underlining how they interact and mutually reinforce 
one another. On the other hand, the focus of the “Livre Vert” is one-sided, as it overly concentrates 
on matters of “hard security” involving civil or inter-state conflict, while neglecting “soft security” 
or the equally significant economic and social impact. 
B) The strategic framework outlined by the “Livre Vert” also presents a paradox. On the one hand, it 
is comprehensive as it proposes policies at the national, European and international level, both over 
the short run and over the long run. The strategies it recommends are much more ambitious and far-
reaching than most other policy papers. On the other hand, the strategic focus is again too narrow as 
it overly relies on “high politics” strategies for adapting to climate change by creating new military 
and governance structures, while neglecting “low politics” strategies of sustainable development for 
mitigating the impact of environmental degradation. 
2)  A) As a result, the security threats and risks identified by the “Livre Vert” do not fit into any 
conventional political categorization. They represent an unusual political undertaking that may be 
labelled as a form of “green hard security”. 
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B) Likewise, the strategic framework outlined by the “Livre Vert” does not fit into any conventional 
political categorization. The strategies it proposes can be seen to represent a form of “green high 
politics”, an attempt to reconcile and bring together the usually separate fields of defence and 
environmentalism.        
3) A) Nevertheless, an analysis that overly focuses on “green hard security” is incomplete. It must be 
combined with an assessment of the economic and social impact of environmental degradation and 
the ways in which “hard” and “soft security” interact. Otherwise, the analysis fails to address the 
danger that climate change may become a systemic crisis. 
B) Likewise, a strategic framework that focuses too narrowly on “green high politics” is insufficient 
to address the systemic risk posed by climate change. In order to effectively tackle such a threat, a 
holistic approach is required, and “high politics” strategies of adaptation must be combined with 
“low politics” strategies for mitigating the impact of environmental degradation.   
Many policy papers tend to analyse threats and risks first, and then to propose policies and 
strategies for addressing them, an approach that is also taken up by the “Livre Vert”. As a result, this 
thesis will analyse the concept of a “green defence” by distinguishing threats from strategies. In 
order to answer the research questions and test the validity of the three groups of hypotheses, the 
thesis will be divided into three chapters:  
1) The first chapter will provide a literature review that analyses how the “Livre Vert” fits into the 
relevant topics of French foreign policy, EU external relations and environmental security.   
2) The second chapter will provide a comparative analysis of the environmental threats and risks 
identified by the “Livre Vert” in relation to other policy papers.  
3) The third chapter will provide a comparative analysis of the strategies and policies proposed by 
the “Livre Vert” in relation to other policy papers.  
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Chapter I: Theoretical literature review 
The “Livre Vert” represents an original political undertaking, hence no scholarly literature is 
yet available to fully analyse the topic. However, the concept of “green defence” is situated at the 
crossroads between three major subjects with an impressive array of academic writing on each: 
French foreign and defence policy, European external relations, and environmental politics/security. 
The aim of this literature review is to critically assess how the concept of a “green defence” can fit 
into the various intellectual traditions of these three fields of scholarship. This will help to determine 
how comprehensive the analysis provided by the “Livre Vert” is when compared to the relevant 
theoretical literature. This first chapter will attempt to answer the three research questions and 
provide a preliminary analysis of the main arguments that will be developed in more detail in the 
next two chapters. 
 
1) How to integrate the concept of a “green defence” with the literature on French and 
European external relations 
 
a) Literature on the evolution of French foreign policy 
There are several important elements in the strategic framework of the “Livre Vert” which fit 
into the Gaullist tradition of French foreign policy. Scholars such as Jean Touchard have underlined 
the importance of independence in the Gaullist paradigm. A famous example was the General’s 
unilateral withdrawal from NATO’s central command structure in 1966, on the grounds that it was 
dominated by the United States.4 Likewise, de Gaulle strongly believed in the idea of “l’Europe 
puissance”, capable of asserting a strong voice on the world stage that was independent from the 
overbearing hegemony of the United States. Yet paradoxically, the Gaullist tradition of independence 
fits into the strategic framework of the “Livre Vert”. The latter supports the idea of “l’Europe 																																								 																					
4 France remained part of the Western Alliance but independent from NATO’s command structure, a peculiar position 
that attracted widespread criticism at the time from other NATO members.  
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puissance”, and outlines strategies to reinforce EU external relations for enabling Europe to become 
a strong power on the world stage.5 Moreover, the “Livre Vert” argues that a strengthened European 
foreign and defence policy is not compatible with the integrated command structure of NATO, which 
is seen to be dominated by the United States. Like de Gaulle, the “Livre Vert” advocates the creation 
of a European framework for external relations outside of NATO and independent from the United 
States:  
Les Etats membres ont affirmé constamment, depuis le traité de Maastricht (…) la vocation de 
l’Union à être dotée d’une politique de défense (…) Cet objectif est incompatible avec la réalité 
hiérarchique de l’OTAN (…) L’inéluctable autonomisation vis-à-vis des Etats-Unis (…) (implique à 
terme que) l’Europe doit avoir l’ambition d’être un acteur stratégique autonome (…) Cette 
émancipation exprimera la volonté des peuples européens à assurer leur propre défense (…) Il ne 
peut revenir au peuple Américain (…) de présider aux choix européens en matière de défense.6    
Second, historians are also in agreement that the Gaullist tradition of French foreign policy 
was characterised by the General’s desire for France to reclaim its “grandeur” or “rank” on the 
international stage. Lacouture explains how de Gaulle was under no illusions that after the end of 
WWII, France and other European countries no longer dominated world affairs as in the past.7 
Nevertheless, he believed that:  
C’est parce que nous ne sommes plus une grande puissance qu’il nous faut une grande politique, 
parce que, si nous n’avons pas une grande politique, comme nous ne sommes plus une grande 
puissance, nous ne serons plus rien.8   
Alain Peyrefitte explains that the General was keen to develop France’s nuclear capacity, which he 
believed would help to restore its standing on the world stage.9 Likewise, Lacouture highlights the 
international dimension of de Gaulle’s foreign policy, his “grande politique mondiale”. For example, 
France became the first Western country to establish diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic 
of China in January 1964, to the consternation of the United States at the time. Once more, there are 
several elements in the strategic framework of the “Livre Vert” that fit into the Gaullist “grande 
																																								 																					
5 A fundamental difference however is that while the “Livre Vert” supports the creation of a federal European army, 
President de Gaulle remained vociferously opposed to any supranational integration.     
6 Aïchi L. (2014), Livre Vert de la Défense, Europe Ecologie les Verts, Reprographie du Sénat, p.73-74.		
7 Lacouture J. (2010), De Gaulle: Tome 3, Le souverain 1959-1970, Seuil Press 
8 Ibid, p.286, Entretien avec Philippe de Saint Robert en avril 1969 (extraits des Septennats interrompus, Laffont-1975). 
9 Peyrefitte A. (2002), C'était de Gaulle, Gallimard Press.  
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politique mondiale”. If France and Europe develop a strong capacity for environmental security, they 
would be on the frontlines of future international efforts to address environmental degradation linked 
to climate change. This would represent an undoubted source of “grandeur” or prestige that the 
General would have supported, placing France and Europe at the heart of one of the main global 
challenges of the 21st century. However, an important point of disagreement relates to the Gaullist 
emphasis on the importance of the nuclear deterrent. The “Livre Vert” is strongly opposed to nuclear 
weapons, and outlines a comprehensive strategy for gradually reducing France’s nuclear arsenal, 
seen as a threat to world peace.   
French foreign policy has undergone important transformations over the last couple of 
decades, and several of these new developments fit into the strategic framework outlined in the 
“Livre Vert”. Frédéric Bozo views the second term of Mitterrand’s presidency as an important bridge 
or point of transition, where several core aspects of the Gaullist paradigm had to be revised due to 
pressures from a rapidly changing international context with the ending of the Cold War.10 For 
example, the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992 led to the adoption of the euro and a supranational 
European monetary policy, which would have been considered an unacceptable loss of national 
sovereignty by de Gaulle. This transition away from the Gaullist paradigm was confirmed by 
Mitterrand’s successors. For instance, President Sarkozy was instrumental in the ratification and 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, which many commentators believe has kept 
the bulk of the provisions contained in the defunct constitutional treaty.11 Moreover, together with 
German Chancellor Merkel, he pushed for deeper integration in fiscal and economic matters in 
response to the Eurozone debt crisis, including a timetable for a banking union. Such developments 
are fully consistent with the strategic paradigm outlined in the “Livre Vert”. The latter strongly 
supports these initiatives towards more supranational EU integration, and EELV is one of the few 
political parties that is openly in favour of a federal European Union. The project of an EU “green 
																																								 																					
10 Bozo F. (2012), La politique étrangère de la France depuis 1945 (Champs Histoire), Flammarion Press, p.192.  
11 Ibid, Epilogue: la rupture?  
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defence” is presented as an opportunity to infuse a new dynamic for deeper European integration and 
provide a springboard for a “federal leap forward”.   
However, there are several important elements in the recent evolution of French foreign 
policy that are not compatible with the strategic framework of the “Livre Vert”. For example, 
President Sarkozy sought to mark his mandate by a rapprochement with the United States, which was 
achieved through France’s full re-integration into NATO’s command structure in March 2009, more 
than forty years after the general’s withdrawal. As underlined above, the “Livre Vert” shares the 
Gaullist emphasis on maintaining independence vis-à-vis the United States by creating a strong 
European defence structure outside of NATO. Moreover, Presidents Mitterrand, Chirac and Sarkozy 
have insisted that initiatives for EU integration in foreign and defence policy since the Maastricht 
Treaty remain strictly intergovernmental and rely on unanimity. The “Livre Vert” is opposed to 
intergovernmental cooperation for EU external relations, and argues that the CFSP and CSDP remain 
weak precisely because they continue to rely on unanimity. The “Livre Vert” believes that only a 
federal European army and a federal structure for external relations can allow Europe to successfully 
meet the new challenges of the 21st century such as climate change. This is representative of the fact 
that the strategies proposed by the “Livre Vert” are bolder and more far-reaching than those from 
other more conventional analyses, an argument that will be developed in the third chapter.  
 
b) The theoretical literature on the EU’s position in the international system 
As we have seen, the “Livre Vert” seeks to place the concept of a “green defence” within the 
institutional framework of EU external relations. It argues that only Europe as a whole has sufficient 
weight and resources both to protect itself and play a major role on the international scene to tackle 
global environmental threats. The second section of this literature review will outline how the 
strategic framework of the “Livre Vert” fits into the main theories and approaches that have been 
developed to explain the EU’s unusual position in the international system.   
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An influential way to interpret the EU’s place in the international system has been to describe 
it as a “civilian power”, a viewpoint that is entirely consistent with the strategies proposed by the 
“Livre Vert”. The concept was coined by François Duchêne, a French scholar who defined a civilian 
power as: “long on economic power and relatively short on armed force”.12 Lacking a federal army 
but representing the largest internal market in the world, the EU fits neatly into Duchêne’s definition. 
The French scholar also underlined that a civilian power is one that relies on non-military means, 
including diplomacy and preventive action, to achieve civilian ends on the international scene such 
as the peaceful resolution of conflicts.13 This fits very well into the “Livre Vert’s” strong emphasis 
on preventive action as one of the central elements of the strategic framework for a “green defence”. 
It recommends the reinforcement of existing institutions such as the European Parliament, as well as 
the creation of new structures entirely devoted to preventive diplomacy on environmental issues. 
Therefore, “green defence” would help to reinforce the notion of the EU as a “civilian power”, 
focused on preventive action that addresses the root causes of environmental degradation.   
The notion of an EU “civilian power” was later extended with the development of the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). While the EU has shown itself capable of using hard 
military power in several high profile operations, the bulk of its missions abroad remain civilian in 
character, focusing on peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction. The EU has succeeded in 
establishing itself as a major civilian power on the international scene, having by 2010 embarked on 
a total of 27 missions in 16 countries on 3 different continents.14 The “Livre Vert” is keen on making 
full use of the EU’s current framework for civilian missions and adapting it to meet the requirements 
of a “green defence”. It underlines that reliance on the civilian element of the military is the most 
appropriate way to respond effectively to environmental crises in the future. This would take a 
variety of forms, including humanitarian rescue missions by the military following natural disasters 
																																								 																					
12 Duchêne F. (1972), “Europe’s Role and Place in World Peace”, in R. Mayne (ed.), Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen 
Europeans Look Ahead, Fontana Press.   
13 Ibid. 
14 Hill C. and Smith M. (2011), International Relations and the European Union (2nd edition), Oxford University Press, 
Chapter 9: The EU’s Security and Defence Policy: Towards a Strategic Approach.  
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linked to climate change. Once more, it is clear that an EU “green defence” would help to reinforce 
the EU’s profile as an international civilian power.    
Second, the EU’s position in the international system may be viewed as that of an “exemplary 
power”, exerting influence through the power of attraction of its model. Scholars such as Hassner, 
Keohane and Nye, have underlined the success of European integration in pacifying a continent 
previously torn by ceaseless warfare, establishing what they call a “pluralistic security 
community”.15 Therefore, the EU’s influence on the world stage is linked to the model it offers of 
how to overcome bitter and ancient historical tensions by building a lasting peaceful alliance. Ian 
Manners further develops this approach in his theory of “normative power Europe”, where the EU is 
able to shape international norms or “what passes for normal in international relations”.16 Manners 
argues that the EU’s normative international influence goes beyond simply offering a model for 
peaceful reconciliation, and also includes its ability to promote democracy, human rights, the rule of 
law, social progress, and sustainable development, to other countries across the world.17  
The notion of “normative power Europe” can only partly be reconciled with the concept of a 
“green defence”. On the one hand, the “Livre Vert” goes further than most other policy papers in its 
proposals to reinforce the EU’s capacity to address environmental security threats, both at home and 
abroad. By following the policy proposals of the “Livre Vert”, the EU could potentially developed 
the world’s most advanced “green defence” institutional framework. As the challenges stemming 
from climate change become more acute, countries around the world would start to emulate the EU, 
whose “green defence” would become a model on how to manage environmental degradation. On 
the other hand, Manners underlines that a key element in the EU’s normative power is the force of 
attraction of its model for environmental legislation based on sustainable development. The EU is 
widely considered to be “leading by example”, as it has enacted the most far reaching environmental 																																								 																					
15 Hassner P. (1968), Change and Security in Europe II: In Search of a System, Adelphi Paper 49 (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies) - Keohane R., Nye J. and Hoffmann S. (1993), After the Cold War: International 
Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, Harvard University Press.  
16 Manners I. (2002), “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common Market Studies 40/2: 
235-58, p.32.  
17 Ibid, p. 32-33.  
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legislation in the world. Because the “Livre Vert” primarily focuses on strategies for adapting to 
climate change by creating new military and governance structures, it tends to neglect mitigation 
strategies for achieving sustainable development. As will be analysed in more detail in the third 
chapter, the “Livre Vert” does not provide a comprehensive strategy to develop renewable energies 
and cut greenhouse gas emissions, which is why its strategic framework is incomplete. As a result, 
the “Livre Vert” does not strictly fit into Manner’s definition of the EU as a “normative power” due 
to the narrow focus of its policy recommendations.    
The last two theoretical paradigms, which present the EU’s role in the international system as 
a “normative” and “civilian” power, rely on Joseph Nye’s concept of “soft power”. This famous 
contribution to the liberal school of international relations theory makes a distinction between “hard 
power”, involving coercive and mostly military action, and “soft power”, or the ability to persuade 
through non-coercive means. Soft power is the ability to make others want what you want.18 The 
“Livre Vert” relies to a great extent on Nye’s notion of “soft power”. It underlines how recent 
international military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya were more problematic than 
originally anticipated, which has highlighted the limitations of coercive hard military power. The 
strategic paradigm of a “green defence” recommends prioritizing preventive action and civilian 
military operations to manage environmental security threats, with hard military power as a solution 
of last resort only if all other options have failed. 
Finally, it is possible to interpret European attempts to integrate in the fields of foreign and 
defence policy, normally the ultimate remit of national sovereignty, as marking the first steps 
towards the creation of a “federal super state” with a major role to play on the world stage.19 
Scholars such as Galtung and Buchan have argued that the EU can be seen as a “superpower in the 
making”: if it is able to integrate foreign and defence policy under a supranational framework, as it 
has already done for trade and monetary policy, the world would witness the most powerful super 																																								 																					
18 Nye J. (2004), Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs Press. 
19 Galtung J. (1973), The European Community: A Superpower in the Making?, Allen and Unwin Press - Buchan D. 
(1993), Europe: The Strange Superpower, Dartmouth Press. 
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state in history.20 This viewpoint corresponds precisely with the argument made in the “Livre Vert”, 
which underlines the great potential for the EU to become a world superpower. Not only is the EU’s 
internal market the largest in the world, but it is also the biggest commercial power, and it’s 
aggregate GDP is higher than that of the United States.21 Likewise, Europe’s combined military 
capacities are also impressive on paper, as the EU and its Member States together account for close 
to a quarter of global military spending.22 Several EU countries also have a global network due to the 
maintenance of strong links with their formal colonial empires, most notably the United Kingdom 
and France, both of which are nuclear powers with permanent seats on the UN Security Council. For 
all these reasons, the “Livre Vert” presents the concept of a “green defence” as an opportunity to 
reinforce European integration along federal lines, particularly for external relations, enabling 
Europe to realise its full potential as a world superpower. The “Livre Vert” underlines that only a 
federal European Union will be strong enough to confront future environmental challenges linked to 
climate change, a bold strategy which goes much further than most conventional analyses on the 
topic:  
La sécurité de chacun des membres de l’UE ne saurait être assurée individuellement face aux 
risques climatiques et environnementaux. Seule l’Europe a la taille critique pour anticiper et 
répondre efficacement aux crises qu’engendreront la modification du climat. 23   
Prolongement naturel d’une Europe fédérale (…) les écologistes (…) affirment leur objectif d’un 
transfert au niveau européen de la compétence régalienne de la défense. 24                     
Le concept de la « green defence » impulserait un mouvement fédérateur pour l’Europe de la défense 
(…) une armée Européenne pourrait alors se construire.25                                  
 L’Union Européenne a vocation à être un acteur stratégique global.26      
 
																																								 																					
20 Ibid.   
21 European Union, How the EU works - The Economy. See: http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-
figures/economy/index_en.htm 
22 Hill C. (2011), p.40.  
23 Livre Vert, p.78,  
24 Ibid, p.73 
25 Ibid, p.85.		
26 Ibid, p.40.  
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2) How to integrate the concept of a “green defence” with the literature on environmentalism 
and environmental security 
 The second section of the literature review will analyse how the concept of a “green defence” 
fits into academic scholarship in the fields of environmental security and environmental politics 
more generally. The first part will provide an overview of how the concept of environmental security 
has developed over time. The second part will define several key notions distinct from, but related to 
environmental security. The third part will outline the main theories and intellectual approaches to 
environmental security.  
a) Overview of how the concept of environmental security has developed over time 
 The seminal work that marked the birth of contemporary academic literature on 
environmentalism was Rachel Carson’s “Silent Spring”, which highlighted the dangers associated 
with excessive use of pesticides and herbicides on plants and wildlife.27 Her work helped propel the 
neo-Malthusian school, with scholars such as Lynn White Jr. or Garrett Hardin underlining the 
unsustainability of the Western capitalist growth model and its negative impact on the environment.28 
Scholars from the “Club of Rome”, a global think tank, were instrumental in raising public 
awareness about the limitations of exponential economic development due to the planet’s finite 
resources.29 Moreover, environmental issues gradually began to be connected to national security. 
The former President of the Worldwatch Institute, Lester Brown, was amongst the first to establish a 
direct link between environmental degradation and US national security. Likewise, Richard Ullman 
argued for the need to redefine national security in the light of new environmental dangers such as 
increasing resource scarcity and uncontrolled population growth.30  
																																								 																					
27 Carson R. (1962), Silent Spring, Penguin Classics Press, New Edition 2000. 
28 White L. Jr. (1967), “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis”, reprinted in Ecology and Religion in History 
(1974), Harper and Row Press - Hardin G. (1968), “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science: New Series, Vol. 162, No. 
3859, pp. 1243-1248. 
29 Meadows D. H. et al. (1972), The Limits to Growth, Signet Press. 
30	Brown L. (1977), “Redefining National Security”, Worldwatch Institute, Paper 14, Washington DC - Ullman R. H. 
(1983), “Redefining Security”, International Security 8, p.133. 
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Nevertheless, it was not until the 1990’s that the academic field of environmental security 
took-off. This was due first to the fact that traditional theories of international relations had proved 
inadequate to anticipate and explain the ending of the Cold War; the realist approach, in particular, 
had explicitly claimed this to be part of its intellectual ambit. The subsequent discrediting of 
traditional approaches to international relations opened the possibility for scholars such as Barry 
Buzan to expand the concept of security beyond the narrow state-centric approach to include 
individual, social and environmental security.31 Policy makers were able to widen their 
understanding of national security beyond the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and give a greater role 
to the United Nations.32 This was the context that led to the 1992 UN Rio Earth Summit, which 
established the foundation for the contemporary environmental movement. The Summit underlined 
the direct link between environmental degradation and international security, and encouraged the 
mainstreaming of environmental security issues into national defence and security strategies. For 
example, it prompted the Clinton administration to incorporate for the first time the concept of 
environmental security into US foreign and defence strategic planning.33   
The rise of the concept of environmental security has been supported by a growing scientific 
consensus about the impact of human development on the Earth’s climate. While the issue was 
contested and debated by scientists for a long time, there is now widespread agreement that the 
probability of human responsibility for global warming is anywhere between 90 to 100%.34 This is 
linked to new technologies that have made it possible not only to enhance our understanding of 
current climate changes, but also to compare them to past climate changes millions of years ago. The 
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2007 report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has summarized the scientific 
consensus on climate change and reached the following conclusions:35  
i) There is unequivocal certainty that the global climate system is warming due to noticeable 
increases in average ocean and air temperatures, as well as the acceleration of the melting of ice 
sheets and the rise of average sea levels. There is a very high probability that this is being caused by 
human activity.   
iii) While there will be both benefits and costs depending on local circumstances, the overall net 
effects of climate change are likely to be strongly negative and to worsen over time.  
iv) Eco-systems around the world are likely to be significantly damaged and many will disappear due 
to a combination of factors linked to climate change, such as ocean acidification, droughts, wildfires, 
and flooding. 
 
b) Definition of key notions related to environmental security  
The 1992 Rio Earth Summit was also instrumental in popularising the concept of “sustainable 
development”, which has become one of the key ideas of environmental politics. The exact meaning 
of sustainable development is contested, but the most prevalent definition was articulated in the 1987 
report by the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development entitled “Our 
Common Future”:  
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: 1) 
the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding 
priority should be given; and 2) the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social 
organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs.36 
The “Livre Vert” has an ambiguous relation with the concept of “sustainable development”. 
On the one hand, the environmental threats and risks it identifies support the idea that the Earth is a 
planet with finite resources. Many of the worrying trends outlined by the “Livre Vert”, such as 
increasing food, water, and primary resource scarcity, as well as rising sea levels and more extreme 
weather events linked climate change, indicate that current global development trends are not 
sustainable over the long run. On the other hand, the “Livre Vert’s” focus on “high politics” 
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strategies for adapting to climate change leads to a neglect of “low politics” strategies aimed at 
achieving sustainable development to mitigate the impact of environmental degradation. The “Livre 
Vert” does not outline policies to develop and apply renewable energies for civilian use, cut 
greenhouse gas emissions and enhance water and food production in a sustainable way. Therefore, 
the concept of a “green defence” presents us with a paradox. The security analysis of threats and 
risks underlines that it is increasingly open to debate whether or not future generations will be able to 
meet their most basic needs. However, by neglecting “low politics” strategies involving sustainable 
development, it shies away from the underlying assumption that there is a moral duty of humanity 
towards future generations that are not yet born, and that present generations must address their 
needs in such a way that the needs of future generations are not compromised. Because the “Livre 
Vert” neglects this key aspect of the concept of “sustainable development” as part of the strategic 
framework for a “green defence”, it remains incomplete.  
The concept of “carrying capacity” is closely linked to the concept of “sustainable 
development”. It is derived from biology and refers to the maximum population size that a natural 
ecosystem can sustain over the long run for a given animal or plant species. Resources such as water 
or food tend to naturally regenerate if they are consumed in moderation. However, if a species grows 
too much and consumes resources faster than they can regenerate, then it has surpassed the natural 
“carrying capacity” of its ecosystem and will start to decline. Populations of animal and plant species 
therefore tend to reach a natural equilibrium that is self-regulating.37 The application of the concept 
of “carrying capacity” to humanity has been highly contentious. Critics such as N.F. Sayre argue that 
even if the concept has been shown to apply to species in small-scale natural ecosystems, it has never 
been demonstrated scientifically to apply to humanity on a global scale.38  
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By contrast, the “Livre Vert” fully supports the application of the concept of “carrying 
capacity to current global development trends. It argues that over the course of the 20th century, but 
particularly during the last few decades, the human species has been growing too fast both 
economically and demographically, stretching the planet’s finite resources to its limits. For example, 
the world population has more than tripled over the course of the 20th century, going from 1.7 billion 
in 1900 to 6 billion in 2000, reaching more than 7 billion people by 2014.39 Most of this 
demographic boom is occurring in developing countries, particularly in Africa, the Middle East and 
South East Asia.40 Likewise, global economic development has increased exponentially, with the 
Real World Gross Product going from 1102 billion dollars in 1900 to over 41016 in the year 2000.41 
Over the last two decades, global economic growth has been driven by the so-called “BRIC” 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), which are widely predicted to economically surpass 
many Western countries during the course of the 21st century.42 The “Livre Vert” argues that such 
trends are likely to result in a sharp increase of global tensions over access to dwindling resources, 
including primary resources, such as petrol, and vital resources, such as water. This represents a 
central aspect of the analysis in the “Livre Vert”, focused on “hard security” or the potential for 
environmental degradation to trigger civil and inter-state conflict.   
Another key concept that features prominently in the “Livre Vert” is the notion of the 
“Anthropocene”. It posits that humanity is responsible for changing the climate to such an extent that 
the world is entering a new geological era. The concept was coined by ecologist Eugene F. Stoermer 
and was popularised by Paul Crutzen. Both argue that greenhouse gas emissions stemming from 
humanity’s industrial development over the last few centuries are leading to a transition from the 
current “Holocene” age to a new geological era marked by warmer temperatures and a changed 
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climate.43 The “Livre Vert” fully supports the idea that human induced activity is leading to a new 
and more dangerous “Antropocene” era. It relies on the 2013 report by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, which underlines that greenhouse gas emissions linked to human development 
have already increased global mean surface temperatures by 0.85ºC between 1880 to 2012. The 
report predicts that this increase is likely to accelerate between 1.1 to 6.4 ºC by 2100, with the most 
accurate estimates ranging between 1.8 and 4 ºC.44 The “Livre Vert” argues that such a sharp 
increase in global mean temperatures is likely to have a dramatic impact on human society, resulting 
in a wide range of environmental threats, such as acute resource scarcity, sea level rise, and an 
increase in extreme weather events. This is one of the main reasons why the strategic framework of 
the “Livre Vert” is focused on adaptation, as it argues it is imperative to create new military and 
governance structures to help absorb the shock stemming from the transition to the new 
“Anthropocene” era: 
L’homme est devenu par l’avancée de sa technique, non plus seulement un être biologique, mais 
collectivement une « force géologique » capable d’infléchir l’évolution de sa planète (…) Cette idée 
est formulée sous le nom « d’Anthropocène », défini comme l’ère géologique nouvelle (…) Ainsi, le 
renforcement des structures de la défense, comme acteur principal notre sécurité (…) s’impose à 
tous comme une impérieuse nécessité (…) pour s’adapter aux défis majeurs du dérèglement 
climatique.45    
 
 The concept of “global commons” is critical because it brings together all of the notions 
analysed above, including environmental security, sustainable development, carrying capacity and 
the Anthropocene. The exact meaning of “global commons” is debated, but one of the most 
widespread definitions is provided by the United Nations Environment Programme’s 2012 report on 
this subject:  
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The ‘Global Commons’ refers to resource domains or areas that lie outside of the political reach of 
any one nation State. Thus, international law identifies four global commons, namely: the High Seas, 
the Atmosphere, Antarctica, and Outer Space. These areas have historically been guided by the 
principle of the common heritage of humankind - the open access doctrine or the mare liberum (free 
seas for everyone) in the case of the High Seas.46   
With the development of science and technology during the 20th century, previously 
inaccessible areas such as the polar regions, the sky and outer space have become open to 
exploration. Thus, the question arose as to whether or not nations, private companies or individuals 
should be allowed to establish property rights over the global commons, or whether they should be 
protected and set aside as the “common heritage of mankind”.47 The international legal framework 
that gradually developed during the 20th century attempted to strictly codify and regulate access to 
the “global commons”, but with mixed results. By way of explanation, legal scholars such as 
Malcolm Shaw underline that international environmental protocols suffer from weak monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms because the traditional rules of State responsibility are not adequate for 
dealing with international environmental obligations.48 
As a result, the “Livre Vert” argues that current institutional mechanisms are insufficient for 
protecting the global commons, as there is no effective system to enforce compliance with 
international environmental treaties. A prominent example is that of the Arctic Council, in charge of 
protecting access to the North Pole, which issued only a symbolic condemnation when Russia 
unilaterally planted its flag there in August 2007 to substantiate territorial claims over a wide span of 
the Arctic’s rich natural resources.49 The “Livre Vert” underlines that predatorial exploitation of the 
global commons is likely to worsen in the coming decades because supplies of vital and primary 
natural resources in areas covered by national jurisdiction are gradually shrinking. This is pushing 
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states and private corporations to look into new, unexploited parts of the global commons for 
additional resources to support demographic and economic growth. At the same time, global 
warming in the Arctic region has started to make the ice melt, liberating vast reserves of natural 
resources previously inaccessible. The “Livre Vert” argues that such trends represent a “perfect 
storm”, where international competition over access to the global commons is likely to escalate in the 
future and result in a global security crisis. This represents a central element in the “Livre Vert’s” 
focus on the “hard security” dimension of environmental degradation.     
A scholarly debate has emerged over whether it is still possible to reach an international 
agreement on how to manage the global commons. One side of the debate argues that, although it is 
becoming increasingly difficult, it is still possible to achieve and is in the interest of the international 
community as a whole that a solution be found. For example, Mahnken and Jasper recommend 
military deterrence as the best way to contain states that breach the international rules and, as a last 
resort, the use hard of military power by a coalition of nations to force compliance with international 
environmental obligations. They argue that the United States, which is still the main global 
superpower, is best positioned to lead international efforts at managing the global commons in 
cooperation with allies.50 The “Livre Vert” agrees that military force might be necessary as a last 
resort to force compliance with international environmental regulations and to protect the global 
commons. However, it is strongly critical of what it perceives as American unilateralism post-Cold 
War, particularly the handling of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Thus, it argues that the only legitimate 
framework for managing global environmental problems remains the United Nations, and that 
military intervention to protect the global commons can only be legitimate if authorized by the 
Security Council. Moreover, it argues that a more integrated European defence structure should play 
a major role in international efforts for protecting the global commons, in cooperation with the 
United States.   
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Brousseau et al. argue that the best strategy for managing access to the global commons 
resides in building new and stronger global governance structures, as current mechanisms are 
inadequate.51 First, they support the development of new mechanisms for multilateral dialogue and 
decision-making where each nation is able to negotiate on an equal footing. The “Livre Vert” agrees 
that new and stronger structures of global governance are required. However, it goes much further 
than most other analyses by emphasising the need to move beyond intergovernmental cooperation, 
reinforcing the UN system to establish a genuine form of world governance. Second, Brousseau et al. 
argue that the complexity of managing the global commons means that any effective solution must 
be multi-level, involving concrete measures taken at the international, regional, national and local 
level. The “Livre Vert” fully supports this idea, and the strategic framework it proposes is 
comprehensive in that it outlines a set of policies at all levels (national, European and international) 
and explains how to combine them. Third, Brousseau et al. believe that in order to be legitimate, new 
global governance structures must involve citizens and civil society more directly in decision-making 
processes, critical for addressing the current lack of democratic accountability in international 
decision-making. Due to its focus on macro level issues of “hard security” and “high politics”, the 
“Livre Vert” tends to neglect the micro level, and does not propose ways to reinforce the 
involvement of civil society in global decision-making. This represents one of the main weaknesses 
of the strategic framework for a “green defence” as it is presented.     
The other side of the debate adopts a more pessimistic point of view and is sceptical about the 
possibility for international cooperation over the global commons. For example, William D. 
Nordhaus52 argues that the momentum of climate change and global resource scarcity is speeding up. 
There is widespread inertia on the part of the international community to take bold action for tackling 
environmental degradation and protecting the global commons. Any effective global response is 
likely to prove costly and upset powerful interest groups that are focused on short-term profit; these 
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groups have the resources to put strong pressure on governments through intensive lobbying.53 The 
“Livre Vert” is in agreement that global environmental problems are likely to worsen significantly in 
the coming decades, leading to enhanced international competition over access to the global 
commons. This is one of the main reasons why it identifies environmental issues as primary threats 
and triggers of insecurity, instead of seeing them as secondary “threat multipliers”. Moreover, this 
pessimistic assessment of the future helps to explain why the strategic framework of the “Livre Vert” 
is focused mostly on adapting to climate change (with a corresponding neglect of mitigation 
strategies), as it argues that the world must be prepared for the worst. However, unlike Nordhaus, the 
“Livre Vert” believes it is possible to protect the global commons if bold and far-reaching measures 
are taken at the international level, which will be covered in the third chapter. 
 
c) Main theories and intellectual approaches to environmental security 
The last section of this literature review will analyse the main academic theories and 
intellectual approaches to environmental security and see how they relate to the notion of a “green 
defence”. The theoretical base for contemporary environmental security dates back to the early 
1990’s with scholarship produced by the so-called “Bern-Zurich group” led by Günther Baechler, 
and the “Toronto group” led by Thomas Homer-Dixon.54 These two research groups developed a 
coherent theoretical model by relying on case studies that demonstrated how environmental 
degradation could lead to resource scarcity, which would have adverse political, economic and social 
consequences on local societies and increase the likelihood of conflict.55 Their work was very 
influential, and most of the intellectual approaches discussed below derive either directly or 
indirectly from a critical engagement with the “environmental scarcity and violent conflict thesis”.56 
Since then, the academic field of environmental security has developed into a vast body of literature 																																								 																					
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that is today characterized by diversity, heterogeneity, and, to a certain extent, fragmentation. This is 
due to the fact that there is still no clear agreement amongst scholars as to the exact meaning of 
“environmental security”, and what issues and concepts it refers to. Rita Floyd and Richard A. 
Matthew (as editors), together with a group of prominent international scholars, have provided what 
is so far one of the most comprehensive attempts to synthesize the literature on environmental 
security.57 They identify several main theories or approaches on how to conceptualize the connection 
between security and the environment.  
The first approach groups together literature dealing with the so-called “resource curse”, 
which is fully integrated in the strategic framework of the “Livre Vert”. This theory may appear 
paradoxical at first glance, as it suggests that violent conflict is not linked to resource scarcity as is 
commonly assumed, but is rather the result of local resource abundance, particularly for non-
renewable resources such as petrol or minerals. Indra de Soysa argues that there is a relationship 
between bad, corrupt governance and resource abundance, which in turn often leads to violent 
conflict and insecurity.58 While not naming it explicitly, the “Livre Vert” relies on the resource curse 
theory to explain how environmental degradation is likely to trigger civil or inter-state conflict. It 
argues that the paradox of resources becoming globally scarce but locally abundant means mean that 
countries or regions where resources are still plentiful are likely to become victims of predatorial 
intervention by outside powers. This represents one of the principal elements in the “Livre Vert’s” 
analytical focus on the “hard security” dimension of environmental degradation (to be analysed in 
more detail in the second chapter). 	
The second main approach focuses on the impact of environmental degradation on human 
security, which tends to be neglected by the “Livre Vert” due to its one-sided focus on macro-level 
threats. The concept of “human security” was established by the 1994 United Nations Development 
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Programme (UNDP) report, which defined it as referring to the security of individuals instead of the 
traditional focus on national security:  
(Human security) has two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, 
disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the 
patterns of daily life.59  
This formed part of the post-Cold War momentum to broaden the state-centric realist definition of 
security; since then, analysing the impact of environmental degradation on individuals and local 
communities has become a prominent aspect of the literature on environmental security.60 Again, one 
of the main weaknesses of the analysis in the “Livre Vert” is the lack of consideration for micro-
level “soft security” issues, and the corresponding focus on macro-level “hard security” threats. This 
rather narrow analysis is problematic, since both are	interconnected and mutually reinforcing, and the 
second chapter will analyse in more detail how insecurity at the micro level can spread and trigger 
insecurity at the macro level.  
The third main approach focuses on the link between gender and environmental security, 
another element that does not feature prominently in the “Livre Vert”. The connection between 
feminism and environmental security is linked to the perceived “gender-blindness” of all other 
approaches, which have ignored the fact that women are likely to be more impacted than men by 
environmental degradation due to their often subordinate position and gendered role in many 
traditional societies. Nicole Detraz argues that environmental degradation will mostly affect women, 
and other vulnerable sections of society, including children and the elderly.61 For the same reasons 
that the “Livre Vert” does not consider the human security perspective, it also neglects the issue of 
gender. This is problematic. The second chapter will analyse in more detail how the disproportionate 
impact of environmental degradation on women and other vulnerable sections of society may result 
in significant micro level social disruption, which risks spreading to generate insecurity at the macro 
level. Gender issues represent another example of how the “hard” and “soft” security dimensions of 																																								 																					
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environmental degradation are interconnected and mutually reinforcing, which renders the analysis 
in the “Livre Vert” incomplete.      
The fourth approach focuses on the possibility for cooperation around scarce resources to 
become tools for peacebuilding and conflict resolution, an idea that is taken-up in the strategic 
framework proposed by the “Livre Vert”. This approach stands-out from the other ones described 
above, as it underlines the potentially positive impact of environmental degradation, rather than 
focusing on the likelihood for conflict and human suffering. For example, natural resources such 
food, water or petrol have been identified as possible tools for peacebuilding in a conflict zone, 
because they are vital for recovery and reconstruction.62 While not naming it explicitly, the “Livre 
Vert’s” emphasis on preventive action as a core element in the strategic paradigm for a “green 
defence” relies on the theory of resource scarcity and peacebuilding. The “Livre Vert” proposes to 
create new institutions at all levels that would rely on preventive diplomacy to foster dialogue 
between conflicting parties over environmental tensions points. Cooperative management of natural 
resources would help rebuild trust and foster reconciliation between warring factions.  
The fifth and final approach underlines the relationship between issues of environmental 
security and systemic crisis. The concept of systemic crisis derives from finance, where it refers to 
the risk that the entire financial system may collapse, as opposed to the collapse of one or several 
entities, which can be isolated without harm being done to the system as a whole.63 This is linked to 
growing financial interdependence in the globalized world economy, where the failure of a single 
large entity can trigger a domino effect, bringing down with it the entire financial system, as 
happened in 2008 with the collapse of the US subprime market. The application of the concept of 
systemic crisis to climate change goes back to the beginning of the environmental movement in the 
1960’s, but it has become more prominent with the onset of the global recession since 2008. For 
instance, the “Europe Ecologie Les Verts” movement has warned about the risk that in the not too 																																								 																					
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distant future, the financial crisis might combine with the climate crisis and usher in a devastating 
global systemic crisis.64 The “Livre Vert” shares an ambiguous relation with the concept of 
“systemic crisis” applied to climate change, because the one-sided focus of the analysis examines 
only half the picture.   
On the one hand, the “Livre Vert” is in agreement with scholars such as Fiona Haines, who 
argue that climate change represents a systemic crisis because the root cause of the problem is linked 
to the very nature of the capitalist system itself. Haines provides a comparative analysis of the 
systemic risk stemming from both the financial and environmental crises.65 She argues that the 2008 
global financial crisis became systemic since it resulted in a global economic recession, which spread 
to weaken political legitimacy, generating widespread social unrest across the world. Nevertheless, 
she underlines that the crisis is being resolved with governments bailing out failing institutions and 
pumping vast amounts of money into the economy. This is gradually leading to a resumption of 
economic growth, and a return to a situation of “business as usual” appears to be the most likely 
outcome. However, she emphasises that climate change represents a far more challenging crisis to 
manage, as bailing out failing banks and pumping more money into the economy will not work in 
this case. The “Livre Vert” agrees with Haines that the challenge of climate change is linked to the 
very ideological foundation of the global capitalist system as it developed since the 19th century. The 
latter is based on maximising short-term profit and pursuing unremitting economic growth, with very 
little consideration of the long-term impact on the environment. This is straining the world’s finite 
resources and warming up the planet at a dangerous pace. Hence, the climate crisis is likely to be 
much more problematic to resolve than the current financial crisis, and risks escalating to trigger 
major global insecurity:  
L’impact de l’activité humaine sur le système terrestre est irréfutable. Les conséquences néfastes de 
cette activité (…) révèlent l’impasse d’une mondialisation économique et plus loin, d’un 
développement humain destructeur des conditions environnementales de sa réalisation.66                                                                                                                                																																								 																					
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Il est vrai que le cours de notre civilisation, devenue mondialisée, conduit à l’abîme et qu’il nous 
faut changer de voie.67 
On the other hand, the one-sided analytical focus of the “Livre Vert” means that it neglects 
another major aspect of the systemic risk posed by climate change. Scholars such as Barry Naughten 
argue that the potential for systemic crisis stemming from environmental degradation is related to the 
danger that it will combine with and reinforce other types of systemic risk.68 He underlines that 
climate change can exacerbate a wide variety of different types of threats, which are intimately 
interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Environmental degradation risks impacting virtually all 
aspects of society, triggering at the same time a political, military, economic and social crisis, 
thereby raising the spectre of a comprehensive global systemic crisis over the course of the 21st 
century. This aggregate risk is not taken into consideration by the “Livre Vert”, due to its focus on 
“hard security” threats. There is a neglect of the “soft security” dimension or the equally significant 
economic and social impact of climate change, as well as the interconnectedness of “soft” and “hard” 
security issues. Likewise, by focusing on how environmental degradation can trigger conflict, the 
“Livre Vert” does not examine how climate change can exacerbate many different types of threats 
such as terrorism, crime, cyber-security and nuclear proliferation. As a result, the concept of a “green 
defence” as it is presented only looks at half of the picture. A holistic approach to environmental 
security is needed to successfully address the danger of a comprehensive global systemic crisis 
stemming from climate change. 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																					
67 Ibid, p.110, cited from Edgar Morin in his article « Changer le rapport de l’humanité à la nature n’est qu’un début », Le 
Monde, 13th of June 2009.  
68 Naughten B. (2010), International Journal of Global Energy Issues, Vol. 33 Issue 1/2, p.89-119.    
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3) Conclusion of the first chapter  
Overall, it is apparent that the “Livre Vert” is an unusual political undertaking that does not 
exactly fit into the literature on French foreign policy, European external relations and environmental 
security. While it shares some similarities with various intellectual traditions in those fields, there are 
also many important points of contrast. This first chapter has provided a preliminary analysis of the 
concept of a “green defence” in relation to different theoretical approaches in the relevant fields. The 
points and arguments raised in this chapter will be developed in more detail in the next two chapters 
by comparing and contrasting the “Livre Vert” with official policy papers from governments and 
think tanks. The theoretical analysis in this first chapter will be reinforced by a more practical 
analysis in the next two chapters, first of environmental threats and risks, and then of the 
corresponding strategies to address them.    
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Chapter II: Environmental Threats and Risks 
 
The second chapter of this thesis will provide a comparative analysis of the environmental 
threats and risks identified by the “Livre Vert”. The aim will be to answer the three research 
questions and test the validity of the first group of hypotheses. Are the environmental threats and 
risks identified by the “Livre Vert” comprehensive? Do they fit into any conventional political 
categorization?  Is the security analysis outlined by the “Livre Vert” exhaustive enough to cover the 
potential for systemic crisis stemming from environmental degradation?  
 In order answer the research questions and test the validity of the first group of hypotheses, 
this chapter will be divided into three sections:  
1) The first section will provide a comparative analysis of the environmental threats and risks 
identified by the “Livre Vert” presented from a “hard security” perspective, which focuses on 
their potential to trigger civil and inter-state conflict. We will see that the “Livre Vert” goes 
much further than other analyses on the topic by treating environmental problems as primary 
threats and triggers, showing how they interact and mutually reinforce one another.   
2) The second section will broaden the analysis by looking at the same environmental threats and 
risks from a “soft security” perspective, underlining the equally significant economic and social 
impact, relying on official policy papers, think tank and academic reports.  
3) The third section will show how the interaction between the “hard” and “soft” security 
dimensions of environmental issues has the potential to result in a comprehensive and global 
systemic crisis.    
 
 
 
 
 
		 32	
1) A comparative analysis of the environmental risks identified by the “Livre Vert”  
 
a) The risk of water scarcity  
 The “Livre Vert” identifies water scarcity as a seminal environmental risk, with the potential 
to generate both civil and inter-state conflict. The book provides four main reasons as to why water is 
likely to become scarcer in the coming decades.69 First, uncontrolled demographic growth in many 
regions already exposed to tight water supplies, such as the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa and 
parts of South-East Asia, means that water demand in those areas is increasingly outpacing supply. 
Second, certain countries facing water scarcity are poor and under-developed, relying on archaic 
agricultural techniques and inefficient water storage systems that are very wasteful. Third, strong 
economic growth in many developing countries, particularly the “BRIC’s”, has worsened regional 
water stress due to enhanced agricultural production, which consumes vast quantities of water. 
According to a report by the United Nations Development Programme, up to four billion people 
could face a form of water stress by 2030, a tenfold increase compared to 1995 when it was 
estimated that 400 million people suffered from water scarcity. Likewise, the report underlines that 
up to 90% of the population in the Middle East, North and Sub-Saharan Africa could be affected by 
water stress as early as 2030.70 Fourth, this situation is likely to be exacerbated by climate change, as 
regions already facing hot and dry climates could become exposed to harsher heat waves and 
droughts, further drying up water supplies.  
 A debate has emerged over whether or not growing water scarcity in several highly populated 
regions of the world has the potential to trigger conflict, or “water wars”. Those who refute this, such 
as Wendy Barnaby, argue that “countries do not go to war over water, they solve their water 
shortages through trade and international agreements”.71 She points out that trade in so-called 
“virtual water”, contained in food products, is allowing countries with arid climates to partially offset 
																																								 																					
69 Livre Vert, Chapitre 1: Risques et enjeux stratégiques pour la défense.  
70 Livre Vert, p.31, taken from the 2009 United Nations Development Programme Report: “Communication and 
Influence”.  
71 Barnaby W. (2009), “Do nations go to war over water?”, Nature: International Weekly Journal of Science. 
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water shortages without the need to go to war. Likewise, the 1999 Nile Basin Initiative, a multilateral 
accord between nine countries dependent on water from the Nile River, offers an example of the 
potential for cooperation rather than conflict over the sharing of water.72 On the other hand, a vast 
body of literature has developed over the last few years warning that in the near future, new resource 
wars will be fought over water, just as they are currently fought over oil or gas. In 2007, the British 
non-profit organization “International Alert” published a report that identified 46 countries, 
containing over 2.7 billion people, where the combined effects of climate change and enhanced water 
scarcity had the potential to trigger violent conflict by 2025.73 This led the UN Secretary General 
Ban Ki-Moon to declare that: “The consequences for humanity are grave. Water scarcity … is a 
potent fuel for wars and conflict”.74 The “Livre Vert” firmly stands on this side of the debate, and 
argues that in many parts of the world, virtual water trade and multilateral agreements are 
increasingly unable to contain tensions over access to shrinking water supplies. It argues that this 
critical situation is already generating serious regional tensions that are likely to worsen in the 
coming decades: 
Dans un contexte où l’eau reste un enjeu majeur du fait d’une surexposition aux stress hydriques 
(…) et de l’apparition de conflits d’usage, il est aisé de comprendre que cette ressource est un 
problème excessivement sensible, à l’origine de tensions âpres, voire de violences, qui frappent 
plusieurs régions du monde (…) l’épuisement des ressources hydriques sera un facteur de tensions 
prépondérant dans les décennies à venir.75     
For example, tensions are already high between Ethiopia and Egypt over the construction of a 
dam on the Blue Nile. Ethiopia considers this dam to be vital for its economic development, with the 
potential to generate up to 6000 megawatts of energy. Egypt, on the other hand, claims that this dam 
could threaten its most vital water supply, as the country derives up to 90% of its water needs from 
the Nile River and is already facing serious problems of scarcity. While tensions have not yet 
																																								 																					
72 Ibid.  
73 Smith D. and Vivekananda J. (2007), A Climate of Conflict: The links between climate change, peace and war, 
International Alert.  
74 UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, December 2007. See: 
http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/the_truth_about_water_wars  
75 Livre Vert, p.30-31.  
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escalated thanks to international mediation efforts, both nations have made it clear that they would 
not hesitate to go to war to defend their vital interests on this matter.76  
This is one example of how water scarcity can lead to conflict, which is paralleled by many 
other similar situations across the world. Examples include tensions between Turkey, Iraq and Syria 
over the Euphrates River, Israel and Palestine over the West Bank mountain aquifer77, and, more 
seriously, tensions between India and Pakistan, both of which are nuclear powers, over access to the 
Indus River.78 The “Livre Vert” also underlines the potential for water scarcity to trigger internal 
conflicts, sometimes even leading to state collapse. It points to the example of Sudan, where tensions 
over access to surface waters in the southern “Sudd” wetlands for the construction of the “Jonglei” 
canal were instrumental in the outbreak of the bloody second Sudanese civil war, which lasted from 
1983 to 2005 and led to the independence of South Sudan in 2011.79  
Overall, it is apparent that the “Livre Vert” presents the risk of water scarcity from a “hard 
security” perspective, focusing on its potential to generate civil and inter-state conflict. The “Livre 
Vert” identifies water scarcity as a primary security threat, with the potential on its own to trigger 
major disruption. Such an analysis goes much further than other policy papers dealing with 
environmental security, which tend to treat water scarcity simply as a “threat multiplier”. For 
example, the 2012 National Intelligence Council (NIC) report on global water security underlines 
that water scarcity represents a secondary factor that merely tends to exacerbate other underlying 
primary causes of conflict:  
Water shortages (…) are unlikely to result in state failure (on their own). However, water problems - 
when combined with poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffectual leadership, and 
weak political institutions - contribute to social disruptions that can result in state failure (…) We 
assess that water stresses contribute to or aggravate existing problems.80     
 																																								 																					
76 Ibid, p.30.  
77 Many political scientists argue that the 1967 “Six Day War”, particularly the conflict between Israel and Jordan, was at 
least partly triggered by competition over water supplies. See Floyd R. (2013), Introduction.  
78 Pervez Musharraf, the former president of Pakistan, underlined in his thesis at the Royal College of Defence Studies in 
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distribution of the Indus River and its tributaries. See:  
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b) The risk of food scarcity  
The second principle environmental risk identified by the “Livre Vert” relates to food scarcity. One 
of the main strengths of the security analysis in the “Livre Vert” is that it strongly emphasises the 
potential interconnections between different types of environmental risks. Thus, it goes into detail 
about the direct link between problems of water scarcity and food scarcity. Agriculture is very 
dependent on a large supply of water, as it represents more than two thirds (close to 70%) of global 
fresh water consumption.81 Most of the food consumed globally derives either directly or indirectly 
from agriculture, particularly in developing countries. As a result, the “Livre Vert” underlines that an 
increase in water scarcity will have dire consequences on global food supply. This is also related to 
the gradual depletion of groundwater supplies and aquifers for large agricultural producing regions 
due to over-exploitation. For example, the “Guarani” aquifer in South America is increasingly unable 
to provide enough water to sustain agriculture and food production for millions of people in Brazil, 
Argentina, Paraguay and Bolivia, a factor that has caused mounting social unrest in recent years.82  
Nevertheless, the “Livre Vert” underlines that food scarcity is not only the result of water 
scarcity. It is also linked to strong economic and demographic growth in many developing countries 
that is sharply increasing global demand. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
estimates that if current trends continue, global food demand may increase by as much as 70% by 
2050, requiring a production increase of nearly 100%.83 This situation is leading to over-exploitation 
of agricultural soils, which are gradually becoming exhausted until they can no longer yield any 
more crops:  
Some 40% of the world’s agricultural land is seriously degraded. Among the worst affected regions 
are Central America, where 75% of land is infertile, Africa, where a fifth of soil is degraded, and 
Asia, where 11% is unsuitable for farming.84  
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This situation is likely to be exacerbated by climate change, particularly in regions such as the 
Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where agriculture is being damaged by longer heat waves and 
droughts, or South East Asia due to an increase in the frequency of floods and storms. Unlike the 
debate over the possibility for “water wars”, however, there is widespread agreement about the 
potential for food scarcity to generate insecurity, a recurrent theme throughout history.85 The “Livre 
Vert” points to the food riots of 2007-8 as a contemporary example of how food scarcity can be a 
primary trigger for disruption, threatening fragile states with internal collapse. Following a dramatic 
increase in global food prices in 2007 and early 2008 due to the financial crisis, as many as 61 
developing countries, including several large states such as Bangladesh, Cameroon, Indonesia or 
Mexico, faced widespread social unrest. In 23 countries, violent food riots erupted that involved tens 
of thousands of hungry people who began looting and burning official buildings and city centres. In 
many cases, the riots were only put down with brutal intervention by the military.86  
The “Livre Vert” also underlines the potential for food scarcity to trigger tensions and conflict 
not just internally, but also between states, particularly in relation to fishing rights. Increasingly bitter 
disputes over fishing are an example of how national resource scarcity (in this case the depletion of 
national fish stocks) can push governments and private companies to compete for resources beyond 
national jurisdiction in the global commons (fish stocks in the high seas and oceans).87 Seafood is 
essential to nutritional habits across the world and the problem of overfishing is global in scale, but 
in some regions, such as South-East Asia, the situation is becoming particularly severe. For many 
South-East Asian nations, fishing is not only a central part of ancestral dietary customs, but also 
serves as the local economic backbone in coastal regions. As a result, overfishing in the South China 
Sea has been responsible for depleting fish stocks to such a critical level that bitter disputes between 
China and its neighbours have emerged over the right to exploit the remaining fish stocks. While 
conflict has been averted for the time being, China and other neighbouring countries have stated that 
they will not hesitate to rely on military force if necessary to secure access to vital fish stocks. As a 																																								 																					
85 2013 NIC Report on Natural Resources,	Section 1: Key Drivers and Trends, Food.    
86 Livre Vert, p.32.  
87 Ibid, p.33. 
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result, the “Livre Vert” underlines that the increasingly dire scarcity of global fish supplies could 
result in “fish wars” in the not too distant future.88  
Overall, it is apparent that, like for water scarcity, the “Livre Vert” presents the risk of food 
scarcity from a “hard security” perspective, focusing on its potential to generate civil and inter-state 
conflict. The “Livre Vert” identifies food scarcity as a primary security threat, with the potential on 
its own trigger major disruption. Such an analysis goes much further than most other policy papers 
dealing environmental security, which tend to treat food scarcity, similarly to water scarcity, simply 
as a “threat multiplier”. For example, the 2007 report by the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies underlines that climate change-induced food scarcity represents a secondary factor, with the 
potential only to worsen or magnify other underlying primary causes of conflict such as ethnic 
rivalry, economic decline or corruption.89 
 
c) The risk of fossil fuel and energy scarcity  
 The third main environmental risk identified by the “Livre Vert” relates to scarcity of primary 
natural resources such as petrol, gas and coal, possibly resulting in a global energy crisis. The 
dynamics behind this trend are similar to those driving water and food scarcity, involving at the same 
time strong demographic and economic growth in many developing countries, particularly China and 
the other rising “BRIC” countries. The “Livre Vert” underlines that global consumption of fossil 
fuels has increased exponentially over the last couple of decades. From 1960 to 2010, oil and coal 
consumption has tripled, while natural gas consumption has quadrupled.90 The International Energy 
Agency (IEA) predicts that if current trends continue, global energy demand will increase by 50% 
before 2035, with fossil fuels continuing to provide 80% of the energy supply.91 The “Livre Vert” 
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emphasises that such tendencies are straining fossil fuel reserves around the world. Already, several 
major conventional reserves have reached their “peak”, defined as “the point at which half the total 
oil (or gas) known to have existed in a field or a country has been consumed, beyond which 
extraction goes into irreversible decline”.92 For instance, British Petroleum estimates that at current 
production levels, the world has at most only 46 years left of conventional oil supplies, and 58 years 
of conventional gas supplies. Likewise, the discovery of new oil fields has been declining since the 
1960’s, and those which have been found were in most cases smaller and more expensive to 
exploit.93 These trends have prompted energy experts such as Colin Campbell to underline that the 
world’s fossil fuel reserves may have reached or are close to reaching their “peak” level.94  
Nevertheless, such views are contested, and an important debate has emerged over whether or 
not the world is going to run out of fossil fuel reserves. Those who deny it point to other analyses 
from the IEA, which underline the potential to partially replenish global fossil fuel supplies with new 
technological breakthroughs. The latter have made it possible to extract vast amounts of oil and gas 
using unconventional techniques, such as hydraulic fracturing. In the United States for example, 
massive public and private investment in unconventional fossil fuel extraction is revolutionising the 
energy market. The IEA’s 2012 World Energy Outlook predicts that the US is about to become self-
sufficient for both oil and gas practically for the first time its history. Even more surprising, the 
report explains that if current trends continue, the US could become the world’s largest oil exporting 
nation as soon as 2017, outstripping Saudi Arabia.95 The “Livre Vert” rejects such predictions, 
underlining that technological breakthroughs are merely palliating global fossil fuel scarcity, and that 
global demand for energy is still increasing faster than supply. The book fully supports the idea of an 
imminent global energy crisis, and emphasises that tensions are already growing between and within 
countries over access to dwindling fossil fuel reserves:  																																								 																					
92 Vidal J. (2005), “The end of oil is closer than you think”, The Guardian. See:  
http://www.theguardian.com/science/2005/apr/21/oilandpetrol.news  
93 2013 NIC report on Natural Resources, p.19.  
94 Colin Campbell underlines that: “The first half of the oil age now closes … it lasted 150 years and saw the rapid 
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95 International Energy Agency (2012), World Energy Outlook.  
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La dépendance aux hydrocarbures se heurte à l’épuisement des énergies fossiles (…) l’effet de 
raréfaction provient essentiellement du fait que la consommation croît plus vite que n’augmentent 
les découvertes de réserves d’énergies fossiles. 96  
Face à cette raréfaction grandissante, les acteurs étatiques entrent dans une confrontation (…) 
générant potentiellement des affrontements (…) la raréfaction des ressources devient une source de 
conflit à part entière (…) qui risque aussi de générer des troubles internes graves (…) pouvant se 
muer en guerre civile.97  
 As an example, the “Livre Vert” points to the recent escalation of international tensions over 
access to primary resources in the global commons.98 The melting of parts of the Arctic ice sheet 
linked to global warming has made it possible for the first time to exploit vast reserves of 
hydrocarbons. The US Geological survey estimates that up to 22% of global oil and gas reserves 
could be located beneath the Arctic.99 This has prompted countries bordering the Arctic Circle, 
including Canada, Russia, the United States and the Scandinavian nations, to make competing claims 
to territorial and economic rights over Arctic resources. Tensions escalated in August 2007 when the 
Russian expedition Arktika unilaterally planted a Russian flag at the North Pole.100 Likewise, the 
“Livre Vert” highlights that international competition over access to offshore gas and oil located in 
the high seas and oceans has increased over the last decade. Two prominent examples involve 
heightened tensions between China and its South-East Asian neighbours over islands in the South 
China Sea thought to contain vast off-shore fossil fuel reserves, vital for supporting the region’s 
economic growth. This includes bitter disputes over the Senkaku / Diaoyu islands opposing China 
and Japan, and the Paracels / Spratleys islands opposing China against the Philippines, Taiwan, 
Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei.  
Furthermore, the “Livre Vert” also underlines the potential for civil conflict linked to 
competition over domestic hydrocarbon reserves. The book points to the example of South Sudan, 
where rivalry over control of the regions’ extensive oil reserves was one of the main triggers of a 
series of civil wars beginning in 1983 and continuing to this day. Petrol continues to destabilise the 																																								 																					
96 Livre Vert, p.24.  
97 Ibid, p.26.  
98 Ibid, p.28.  
99 US Congressional Hearing (2009), Strategic Importance of the Arctic in US Policy, p.15. See: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2009_hr/arctic.pdf  
100 Livre Vert, p.28.  
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region, as was demonstrated with the recent attacks by south Sudanese rebels on pipelines in the 
“Abyei” region near Karthoum. Likewise, Nigeria has been plagued by chronic instability due to 
ceaseless attacks by pirates marauding the new offshore oil and gas platforms, driving up energy 
prices and leading to widespread social unrest.101 This is not only due to local corruption and bad 
governance, but also represents an example of the resource curse theory. 
Overall, it is apparent that the “Livre Vert” presents the risk of primary resource scarcity from 
a “hard security” perspective, focusing on its potential to generate both civil and inter-state conflict. 
The book goes further than most other policy papers on the topic by underlining the potential 
interconnection between a global energy crisis and other environmental risks. First, it underlines that 
unconventional fossil fuel extraction techniques such as hydraulic fracking are very dependent on 
large amounts of fresh water supplies, which could be compromised in regions facing acute water 
scarcity. Second, it emphasises that large offshore fossil fuel reserves and coastal power plants are 
very vulnerable to sea level rise and an increase in extreme weather events such as hurricanes, both 
of which are directly related to climate change. For example, hurricanes Katrina and Rita that hit the 
south coast of the United States in 2005 destroyed as many as 113 offshore petrol and gas platforms 
and seriously damaged 52 platforms and 457 pipelines. Six months later, 46% of energy 
infrastructure was still not operational again.102 This perspective differs from many other policy 
papers on the topic; for example, the 2013 NIC Report on Natural Resources treats energy security, 
climate change and water scarcity separately and does not emphasise to the same extent their 
interconnectedness.  
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d) The risk of mineral scarcity  
Minerals are another important primary natural resource that is analysed by the “Livre Vert”, used 
both for personal collection (gold, silver or diamonds) and industrial production (copper, steel or 
iron).103 The “Livre Vert” underlines that for the same reasons as hydrocarbons, global demand for 
minerals has sharply increased over the last couple of decades, and the supply has struggled to keep 
up. The book relies on studies from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), which predict that global demand for minerals could increase by as much as 250% by 2030, 
with a 5.1% increase each year.104 Likewise, the Ellen McArthur Foundation anticipates that global 
ore extraction will rise from eight billion tons annually in 2011 to eleven billion tons by 2020, a 37% 
increase.105 The 2013 report from the NIC on Natural Resources explains that new technologies have 
allowed for the discovery and exploitation of new mineral reserves, in addition to deeper exploitation 
of existing reserves. Nevertheless, the report underlines that demand is increasing faster than supply, 
so that the overall global supply of minerals is shrinking; this is apparent with the continuous 
increase in the price of nearly all types of minerals over the last two decades.106 The “Livre Vert” 
fully articulates the likelihood of a global mineral scarcity crisis. It emphasises that competition over 
access to dwindling mineral reserves is likely to enhance tensions, potentially leading to state 
collapse or inter-state conflict. The book points to the example of competition over access to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’s lucrative mineral reserves of copper, diamonds and gold as being a 
primary cause for the outbreak of the second Congo War that lasted from 1998 to 2003. The latter 
became the deadliest conflict since WWII, and is illustrative of the “resource curse” theory, since it 
attracted intervention by neighbouring states such as Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, drawn in by 
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potential gains from Congo’s vast mineral reserves.107 Likewise, the “Livre Vert” emphasises that 
the “scramble for the Arctic” is also partly due to the discovery of potentially huge mineral reserves 
(see above). This includes metals such as nickel, molybdenum, silver and zinc, whose exploitation 
has become possible with the melting of ice sheets stemming from global warming.108 Combined 
with the discovery of large fossil fuel reserves, the “Livre Vert” believes that international tensions 
over access to Arctic resources is likely to escalate in the coming decades.  
Overall, it is apparent that the “Livre Vert” also presents the risk of mineral scarcity from a 
“hard security” perspective, focusing on its potential to generate civil and inter-state conflict. Once 
again, the book goes further than many other analyses on the topic because it underlines the potential 
interconnection between mineral scarcity and other environmental risks. The “Livre Vert” points out 
that extensive global mining activity over the last couple of decades means that high grade ores are 
increasingly running out, and that the remaining lower grade ores require much more oil and water 
(with hydraulic mining) to extract. As a result, water and fossil fuel scarcity are likely to increase the 
cost of mining activities, further tightening global mineral supplies. Moreover, it points out that 
mining infrastructure in coastal areas is often not well adapted to handle the increase in extreme 
weather events stemming from climate change, leading to increasingly common mine flooding.109 
This contrasts with many other policy papers on the topic, for example the 2013 OECD report on 
Mineral Supply Chains, which does not emphasise to the same extent how mineral scarcity could be 
impacted by other environmental risks.110  
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e) Other types of risks linked to climate change  
The “Livre Vert” posits that climate change is not just a factor likely to exacerbate resource scarcity 
and potentially trigger conflict, but also risks becoming the source of many other significant threats 
to international security. A foremost example is sea level rise stemming from global warming. There 
is increasing evidence that sea level rise is being caused by increased mean surface temperatures due 
both to thermal expansion of ocean and sea waters (as water warms, it expands), and the melting of 
the world’s main glaciers such as Greenland, the Arctic and Antarctica.111 As a result, the 2007 IPCC 
report predicts an increase in global mean sea level between 18 and 59 cm by 2100 due to thermal 
expansion, and between 28 to 79 cm by adding the melting of global ice sheets.112 However, the 
“Livre Vert” insists that IPCC reports and many other analyses on the topic are too conservative and 
have consistently under-estimated the impact of sea level rise. It relies on other more alarmist 
projections such as the 2010 report by the US National Research Council, which suggests global sea 
levels could rise by 2 metres up to 2100.113 The “Livre Vert” emphasises that all coastal areas are 
likely to face at least some of the potentially devastating consequences of sea level rise, while some 
small island nations may disappear altogether. For example, a one-metre sea level rise would flood 
about 75% of dry land in the Maldives (Indian Ocean) or the Marshall islands (Pacific Ocean), 
rendering them uninhabitable.114 The parts of the world most vulnerable to sea level rise are the over-
populated river delta regions in developing countries such as Bangladesh, Nigeria, Thailand or 
Egypt. The latter could face mass population displacement involving millions of people. Of these, 
Bangladesh is probably the most exposed, as over half the country is located less than five meters 
above sea level, and a quarter of the landmass is flooded each year during the monsoon season. 
While this is necessary for fertilising the agricultural soil, the destruction caused by the floods has 
been increasing since the 1990’s. The World Bank has estimated that by 2100, relative sea level in 																																								 																					
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Bangladesh could increase by up to 1.8 metres, resulting in a loss of over 16 % of the country’s 
landmass containing 13% of its population.115  
Furthermore, the “Livre Vert” underlines that climate change is also likely to result in a sharp 
increase in the intensity and frequency of storms, hurricanes, heat waves and droughts. While the 
issue is still being debated, many scientists now agree that global warming is probably one of the 
main factors responsible for the multiplication of extreme weather events observed over the last 
couple of decades.116 For example, the occurrence of storms and hurricanes is directly related to sea-
surface temperatures. Hurricane Katrina, which destroyed the city of New Orleans in August 2005, is 
one example of the potentially devastating consequences extreme weather events may have in the 
future.117 The “Livre Vert” also highlights that severe heat waves, already impacting parts of the 
world with arid climates such as the Middle East or sub-Saharan Africa, may spread to temperate 
regions such as Europe. Several IPCC climate models predict that the 2003 European summer heat 
wave that killed over 35,000 people could become the average summer temperature by 2050. This 
would cause a sharp increase of droughts, wild fires and other types of risks linked to higher 
temperatures.118  
The “Livre Vert” emphasises that the combination of all environmental risks outlined above is 
likely to result in potentially huge numbers of global climate refugees. While the there is still 
disagreement on this matter, policy papers such as the 2009 Report by the UN Secretary-General on 
environmental security, estimate that climate change could result in between 50 to 350 million 
refugees by 2050.119 The “Livre Vert” goes much further and criticizes other analyses for being too 
conservative. It underlines that the aggregate impact of environmental degradation could result in up 
to 1 billion climate refugees by the end of this century if current trends continue unabated.120 This 
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potentially huge number of displaced people is likely to pose major challenges for the international 
community. Already fragile countries could become overwhelmed and unable to deal with millions 
of displaced citizens, leading to significant internal disruption and even state collapse. Neighbouring 
countries might feel threatened by invading swarms of climate refugees and come to rely on military 
force to protect their borders, potentially leading to inter-state conflict.  
For all these reasons, the “Livre Vert” argues that it is essential for the international 
community to recognize that climate change is not just a mere “threat multiplier”, but represents a 
primary threat that can trigger major disruption in and of itself. For example, the book is critical of 
the 2009 report by the UN Secretary General on the security implications of climate change, which 
continues to highlight that “it is useful to think of climate change as a threat multiplier, namely a 
factor that can work through several channels to exacerbate existing sources of conflict and 
insecurity”.121 The “Livre Vert” points to this consistent under-estimation of environmental risks as 
one of the main reasons why finding global solutions has been so problematic, as these risks are still 
not taken seriously enough. Therefore, one of the main contributions of the “Livre Vert” to the field 
of environmental security is to raise the standing of environmental issues to that of primary threats 
and triggers of insecurity, instead of treating them merely as secondary “threat multipliers”: 
Le dérèglement climatique, plus qu’un simple multiplicateur, est un risque stratégique à part entière 
par le caractère inédit (…) et global de ses conséquences (…) il représente un risque stratégique 
direct pour les Etats.122   
Il est essentiel de traiter le dérèglement climatique comme risque stratégique à part entière, 
dépassant ainsi la simple vision d’un effet multiplicateur.123  
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f) Conclusion of the first section  
 Overall, it is apparent from this first section that the “Livre Vert” analyses environmental 
risks, whether they relate to climate change or resource scarcity, from a “hard security” perspective, 
focusing on their potential to generate conflict and affect international security. The analysis 
provided by the “Livre Vert” is comprehensive in that it looks in detail at the main environmental 
risks, highlighting how they interact and mutually reinforce one another. It also goes further than 
other policy papers by presenting environmental issues as primary threats and triggers of insecurity, 
instead of treating them as secondary “threat multipliers”. Nevertheless, it is equally clear that the 
security analysis is narrow because it neglects the “soft security” dimension of environmental risks. 
The second section of this chapter will seek to determine whether the “soft security” or the economic 
and social effects of environmental degradation are as significant as the impact of “hard security” 
issues. This will allow us to ascertain whether or not the security analysis presented by the “Livre 
Vert” is comprehensive, and whether the concept of a “green defence” should be broadened to also 
include the “soft security” dimension of environmental risks. 
 
2) The economic and social impact of environmental degradation  
 
a) The economic and social impact of vital resource scarcity (water and food)  
 The economic and social consequences of water and food scarcity are potentially severe. The 
“Livre Vert” does mention that climate change is likely to seriously impact countries whose 
economy relies on agriculture or hydropower, particularly in Africa, the Middle East and parts of 
South East Asia. However, it does not analyse this in detail, as it concentrates on “hard security” or 
the potential for “water wars” and “food riots” in the near future. This stands in contrast to many 
other policy papers on environmental security, which tend to focus more on the “soft security” aspect 
of vital resource scarcity. For example, the 2013 NIC report on Natural Resources underlines that 
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water is of critical importance in a wide range of manufacturing industries, but especially for the 
energy sector. In the latter case, water is relied on for cooling systems in nuclear and thermal power 
plants, but especially for generating electricity in hydropower stations. The report highlights that 
water consumption by the energy sector is likely to more than double by 2030, meaning that water 
scarcity could trigger a global energy crisis.124 Likewise, the 2012 Worldwatch Institute report 
contends that many countries likely to be impacted by water scarcity in the near future rely on 
hydropower to generate a large proportion of their energy. Already, hydropower accounts for 16% of 
global electricity generation, a figure expected to rise by about 3.1% every year over the next 25 
years.125 In 2010, China derived 6.7% of its energy from hydropower, and in Brazil, the figure was as 
high as 35.3%. Both countries rely partly on cheap energy from hydropower to sustain their strong 
economic growth, which could be seriously impacted if water flows dry up.126  
However, the most significant economic impact of water scarcity is likely to be its negative 
effect on agriculture, still the economic backbone for many developing countries. For example, the 
UN Food and Agricultural Organization states that, while agriculture represents merely 3% of global 
GDP, for the vast majority of developing countries it represents at least 25% of national GDP.127 
Likewise, the International Labour Organization highlights that about one billion people, 
representing more than a third of the global workforce, work in the agricultural sector, again mostly 
in developing countries.128 In Africa for example, agriculture employs as much as 65% of the 
available labour force, accounting for 32% of the continent’s GDP.129 As a result, water and food 
scarcity are likely to enhance the gap between rich and poor countries. This is because richer nations 
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tend to have more diversified economies, as well as more resources to protect themselves from the 
economic shock of water scarcity and agricultural decline. 
Moreover, while the “Livre Vert” mentions that climate change will disproportionately 
impact the poorest sections of the world population, it neglects the micro level impact of vital 
resource scarcity, focusing instead on macro level issues of international security. This differs from 
many other policy papers on the topic, which tend to concentrate on the human security perspective, 
involving the effects of food and water scarcity on individuals and communities. For example,	the 
International Food Policy Research Institute estimates that agricultural decline due to rising global 
demand, soil exhaustion and climate change is likely to result in a sharp increase in the price of all 
basic food commodities. The price of maize could double by 2050, while the price of wheat and rice 
could increase by up to 60%.130 Other more alarmist reports from the Institute of Development 
Studies predict price increases of 70% for all basic cereals by 2030, and anywhere between 130 and 
170% after the impact of climate change.131 Consequently, basic food items risk becoming 
unaffordable for the poorest sections of the world population, potentially driving hundreds of 
millions of people into extreme poverty and triggering widespread famines in developing countries.  
Moreover, the 2012 NIC report on global water security underlines that vital resource scarcity 
is likely to enhance the proliferation of infectious diseases and pandemics.132 As water reserves dry 
up and food prices increase, poor people, particularly in developing countries, will increasingly be 
forced to rely on substandard and contaminated food and water supplies. Lethal waterborne and 
foodborne diseases include cholera, dysentery or typhoid fever, which will impact children and the 
elderly disproportionately. The 2006 UN Human Development Report highlights that on average, a 
child dies from a foodborne or waterborne disease every 15 seconds, a figure likely to double in the 
coming decades due to climate change.133 Finally, scholars such as Nicole Detraz have analysed vital 
resource scarcity through the lens of gender studies to underline that women, due to their often 
																																								 																					
130 2013 NIC report on Natural Resources, p.7.  
131 Ibid, information taken from the Institute of Development Studies.  
132 2012 NIC report on global water security, p.5. 
133 United Nations Human Development Report (2006), Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water crisis.   
		 49	
subordinate position in many traditional societies, risk suffering disproportionately from the effects 
of climate change.134 For example, as water and food become scarce, women will increasingly be 
unable to fulfil their imposed gendered role as homemakers and child bearers. Climate change will 
disproportionately impact the most vulnerable members of society, including women, as well as 
children and the elderly; this risks causing significant micro level social disruptions.   
Therefore, given the potentially significant socio-economic macro and micro level impact of 
vital resource scarcity, the analysis of the “Livre Vert”, focused on macro level “hard security” 
issues, appears to be incomplete. The concept of a “green defence” should be broadened to include a 
“soft security” analysis of the economic and micro level social impact of vital resource scarcity. 
 
b) The economic and social impact of primary resource scarcity (fossil fuels) 
 Similarly to vital resources, scarcity of natural primary resources such as petrol, gas or 
minerals may also have far reaching economic and social consequences. The “Livre Vert” mentions 
that, given the critical importance of fossil fuels for global energy supply, the dwindling of 
conventional reserves is likely to trigger supply shocks in the future that could significantly affect the 
global economy. However, it does not analyse this in detail, as it focuses rather on the risk of both 
inter-state and civil conflict over shrinking fossil fuel reserves. This differs from many policy papers 
on energy security, which tend to concentrate more on “soft security” issues involving the impact of 
primary resource scarcity on the global economy. For example, the 2013 NIC report on Natural 
Resources underlines that because global demand for energy is increasing faster than supply, markets 
for primary resources are becoming increasingly tight and prices are likely to continue rising in the 
coming decades. Already the price of oil has inflated from a little over 20 dollars a barrel in 1990 to 
reach a peak at 145 dollars a barrel in July 2008, a more than seven-fold increase.135 The IEA 
anticipates that because of a strong increase in domestic energy demand from oil exporting countries 
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such as Saudi Arabia, the price of oil is likely to remain high in the coming decades, and could return 
to 140 dollars per barrel by 2035.136  
If new extraction techniques and renewable energies are unable to compensate for depleting 
conventional supplies, the global economy may face potentially very disruptive supply shocks in the 
near future. This already occurred in 1973 and 1979, when the two subsequent oil shocks triggered a 
global recession that lasted for at least a decade and put a brutal end to the post-War economic boom. 
The 2013 NIC report on Natural Resources underlines that climate change, combined with an 
exponential increase in global energy demand and dwindling conventional reserves, could result in 
acute supply shocks potentially far worse than those of the 1970’s.137 This is because the global 
economy remains extremely dependent on fossil fuels, which currently represent 81.6% of global 
energy consumption, including 31.5% for oil, 21.3% for natural gas and 28.8% for coal.138  
In order to avoid this looming global energy crisis, we saw in the previous section that many 
governments and private companies have begun to invest in “unconventional techniques” of 
extraction such as shale oil and gas. The “Livre Vert” and the EELV movement are very critical of 
these new unconventional extraction techniques. They underline that there are growing fears they 
could be much more damaging for the environment than conventional extraction techniques.139 The 
example of hydraulic fracturing is illustrative, as many scientists now believe it may increase the 
frequency of earthquakes and possibly lead to irreversible pollution of groundwater supplies, 
essential for agriculture and drinking water.  
Once more, however, the “Livre Vert” differs from many other policy papers on energy 
security by neglecting to analyse the economic impact of the shale oil and gas “revolution”. For 
example, the 2013 NIC report on Natural Resources underlines that, while unconventional fossil 
fuels are helping to significantly reduce dependence on imported oil and gas, they are more 
expensive to extract than conventional reserves. Therefore, the effect is to exacerbate the ongoing 
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increase in the price of fossil fuels, with further negative consequences on the global economy.140 
The NIC report also underlines that poor and developing countries are likely to suffer the most, since 
many of them lack the financial means to engage in widespread development of unconventional 
hydrocarbons. Thus, they risk facing acute energy shortages in the coming decades as conventional 
supplies dwindle. This is likely to compromise their economic development, as well as exacerbate 
the gap between developed and developing nations.  
Similarly to vital resource scarcity, the “Livre Vert” also tends to neglect the micro level 
impact of primary resource scarcity, focusing instead on how competition over dwindling fossil fuel 
reserves at the macro level threatens international security. This stands in contrast to many other 
analyses on energy security, which have increasingly come to adopt a so-called “critical approach”. 
Instead of concentrating on the ability of powerful states in the developed North to secure their 
energy supply, “a critical energy security perspective relates more to the ability of individuals (…) to 
secure sufficient access to energy for their personal needs (…) particularly in marginalized and 
deprived communities (…) in the (less developed) South”.141 Policy papers such as the 2013 NIC 
report on Natural Resources underline that the poorest sections of the world’s population are already 
struggling to cope with high oil and gas prices to meet daily needs such as transport, food and 
heating. In many developing countries, fuel costs already amount to at least 50% of low-income 
household expenditure. As a result, an increase in global fuel prices would significantly deteriorate 
the standard of living for hundreds of millions of poor people.142 Therefore, like water and food 
scarcity, primary resource scarcity is likely to exacerbate the gap between the richer and poorer 
sections of the world population, enhancing economic inequalities.  
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c) Other economic and social consequences of climate change  
 The total economic cost of climate change is difficult to measure. The “Livre Vert” estimates 
that the cumulative effects of environmental degradation could become overwhelming and result in 
another “Great Depression”, potentially even worse than those of the 1930’s and 2008.143 However, 
it does not analyse this in detail, as it focuses on how sea level rise and extreme weather events can 
generate widespread destruction and mass population displacement, threatening international 
security. This differs from other policy papers on the topic, many of which focus on “soft security”, 
or a detailed analysis of the aggregate economic consequences of global warming. For example, the 
2006 report by the British economist Nicholas Stern underlines that if appropriate measures are not 
taken immediately, the cost of climate change could well become astronomical in the coming 
decades.144 While the so-called “Stern Report” has been criticized, many economists now support its 
conclusions that mitigation of the worst effects of climate change requires an immediate investment 
of between 1 to 2% of global GDP each year. Otherwise, the negative effects will accumulate during 
the course of the century and could end up costing up to 20% or more of global GDP each year, 
perhaps indefinitely.145  
Part of this seemingly gigantic cost is linked to concerns about growing water, food and 
primary resource scarcity discussed above. Another aspect relates to the real possibility that sea level 
rise, combined with an increase in the frequency of extreme weather events, could result in major 
disruptions to vital financial or industrial centres. For example, hurricane Sandy completely shut 
down New York City for several days when it hit the US East Coast in October 2012, and ended up 
costing approximately 68 billion dollars.146 Likewise, in a letter to The Times in January 2013, 
Richard Bloore, formerly a member of the Thames Barrier Project Management Team, expressed 
concern that London’s great flood barrier, designed in the decades following WWII, may not be 																																								 																					
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equipped to handle the type of flooding and extreme weather scientists predict could result from 
climate change.147 London and New York being the world’s two leading financial centres, it is easy 
to imagine the potentially catastrophic impact on the global economy if extreme weather events were 
to shut them down for a prolonged period of time.  
While the “Livre Vert” does mention that climate change could lead to a proliferation of 
pandemics and respiratory diseases, it tends to neglect the human security perspective or the impact 
on individuals and communities. By contrast, many other policy papers have focused on a detailed 
analysis of the micro level impact of climate change. For example, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) states that the increase in global mean temperatures is likely to result in a warmer climate 
conducive to the proliferation of diseases such as malaria or dengue fever, which thrive in tropical 
climates.148 As a result, the report underlines that the changing of the Earth’s climate may cause 
pandemics previously limited to the southern hemisphere to spread north to formerly temperate 
climates, such as Southern Europe. Likewise, a 2014 report by the WHO highlights a direct link 
between the global increase of respiratory diseases, cancers or strokes and growing industrial 
pollution, particularly air pollution in large cities. For example, the report underlines that air 
pollution was responsible for killing seven million people worldwide in 2012, and is already the 
leading cause of death in China, where it has become a major national health concern.149 
Furthermore, the 2009 report by the UN Secretary General on environmental security also points to 
the potentially significant impact of climate change on micro level issues such as cultural diversity 
and human rights. Climate change is likely to jeopardise the protection and achievement of a whole 
range of human rights enshrined in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the 
rights to life, health, food, water and housing.150 Similarly, the report explains that: 
																																								 																					
147 Bloore R. (3 January 2013), “Letters to the Editor: Thames Barrier”, The Times.  
148 World Health Organization, Climate change and infectious diseases. See: 
http://www.who.int/globalchange/climate/summary/en/index5.html  
149 World Health Organization (2014),	Media centre: 7 million premature deaths annually linked to air pollution. See: 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/air-pollution/en/  
150 2009 Report by the UN Secretary-General on Climate Change and Security, p.7.  
		 54	
Climate change poses a fundamental threat to cultural survival for those societies whose territories 
and ways of life are threatened by sea level rise and inundation, as noted by small island developing 
states (…) such people may also face challenges in using migration as a coping strategy as a result 
of discrimination in receiving locations.151    
 
d) Conclusion of the second section  
 Overall, the “soft security” socio-economic impact of environmental degradation at the micro 
and macro level is likely to be very significant, as much so as the risk of civil and inter-state conflict. 
Consequently, the security framework of the “Livre Vert” presents us with a paradox. On the one 
hand, it provides a comprehensive analysis of the main environmental risks, as well as how they 
interact and mutually reinforce one another. Moreover, in contrast to most other analyses, it presents 
environmental issues as primary threats in and of themselves, and not just as secondary “threat 
multipliers”. On the other hand, by overly concentrating on “hard security” or how environmental 
degradation can threaten international security, the focus of the “Livre Vert” is one-sided. The 
concept of “green defence” should be broadened by integrating a “soft security” analysis of the 
equally significant economic and social impact of climate change.  
For all these reasons, the security analysis of the “Livre Vert” does not really fit into any 
conventional political categorization. It does not correspond to a typical “hard security” perspective; 
realist scholars, while sharing the same concern for civil and inter-state conflict, have traditionally 
neglected environmental matters, which are not considered to have any bearing on national and 
international security.152 At the same time, we have seen above that the “Livre Vert” does not 
resemble a typical environmental policy analysis, which usually concentrates on “soft security” 
issues involving the socio-economic effects of environmental degradation at the micro and macro 
level. As a result, the “Livre Vert” represents an unusual hybrid, mixing together a “hard security” 
framework focused on matters relating to conflict and international security with environmental 
challenges such as climate change and resource scarcity. Such an original outlook is best described 
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as a form of “green hard security”, an attempt to reconcile the usually separate fields of defence and 
environmentalism. This represents a valuable and insightful contribution to both fields. Nevertheless, 
the one-sided focus of the security analysis in the “Livre Vert” means that the concept of a “green 
defence”, as presented, fails to address the danger that climate change may usher in a comprehensive 
systemic crisis. 
 
3) The potential for a comprehensive systemic crisis linked to environmental degradation  
 
a) How the interaction between “hard” and “soft” security can result in a systemic crisis  
 The potential for a systemic crisis stemming from environmental degradation is not only 
linked to the danger that the “hard security” risks described in the first section will simply be added 
to the “soft security” risks described in the second section. While this certainly represents an 
important aspect of any climate-related systemic crisis, it is only half the picture. The heart of the 
problem relates to the fact that both types of risks are in many ways interconnected and mutually 
reinforcing. There are many different ways in which the “soft security” socio-economic macro and 
micro level impact of environmental degradation might exacerbate and reinforce the “hard security” 
risk of civil and inter-state conflict, the main focus of the “Livre Vert”. The following section will 
provide some ideas and examples of how they potentially interact.  
First, as the economic and social effects of climate change become more severe and hits poor 
countries disproportionately, tensions are likely to escalate between developed and developing 
countries over rights to emit greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere (part of the global 
commons), threatening international security. Already, it has proven to be very difficult at world 
summits in Kyoto or Copenhagen to reach an agreement on which countries should bear the greatest 
share of emissions cuts. The latter are considered to harm economic growth, but are necessary to 
mitigate global warming. Developing countries have rightly pointed out that developed Western 
nations have already contributed a historical share of emissions since the industrial revolution in the 
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19th century. This has allowed them to develop economically, and it would be unfair to impose 
drastic cuts on emerging countries and deny them the same right to develop. Rhetoric from 
developing countries has become increasingly hostile over the last two decades. For example, the 
President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, insisted on several occasions that climate change represents 
an unacceptable “act of aggression” by rich countries against poor countries.153 From a legal 
perspective, this has led developing countries to put strong pressure for obtaining “opt-outs” from 
international environmental treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol, which rely on symbolic but non-
binding emission cuts.154 This situation has become increasingly problematic, as powerful countries 
such as the United States have refused to contemplate any significant legally binding agreement to 
cut emissions as long as developing countries are not also included. The latter are now responsible 
for the more or less the same share of global emissions as developed countries, with China becoming 
the largest world CO2 emitter in 2007. This has had the effect of stalling international climate 
negotiations, further enhancing tensions between rich and poor countries.       
Second, a similar situation might occur at the micro level, as we saw how resource scarcity is 
likely to exacerbate economic inequalities between the rich and poor sections of the world 
population. This could make poor people in both developed and developing countries more resentful 
and more desperate, fuelling the rise of domestic social tensions. In already fragile countries, this 
situation might become overwhelming, potentially leading to civil conflict. Third, we have seen 
above that climate change risks impacting vulnerable sections of society disproportionately, 
including women, children and the elderly, particularly in underdeveloped parts of the world. This 
could result in prolonged and widespread micro level social disruptions which, over the long run, 
could trigger significant insecurity at the macro level.  
Fourth, the increased possibility of global pandemics due to warmer temperatures, as well as 
food and water scarcity, poses a major threat to international security. Already unstable countries risk 
																																								 																					
153 Abbott C. (2008), An uncertain future: law enforcement, national security and climate change, Oxford University 
Research Group, Foundation for International Relations and Foreign Dialogue.  
154 Evans M. D. (2010), International Law (3rd edition), Oxford University Press, Chapter 23: International 
Environmental Law.  
		 57	
not being able to deal with an internal pandemic, which could trigger civil unrest. In a worst-case 
scenario, entire countries and regions may be forced to close down their borders in an effort to avert 
the spread of lethal contagious diseases and to defend them militarily against refugees fleeing from 
contaminated areas.  
Finally, if climate change ends up costing 20% of global GDP for a prolonged period of time, 
nations with large defence budgets, such as the United States, France or China, will be forced to 
drastically cut back on military spending. This could seriously weaken national defence capabilities 
precisely at a time when both domestic and international tensions are likely to peak due to the 
combined effects of environmental degradation. Indeed, countries that are suffering acutely from the 
internal economic and social effects of climate change risk becoming more belligerent on the 
international stage, especially in their attempt to secure access to vital resources such as water and 
food, enhancing the threat of inter-state conflict.  
 Therefore, the ways in which “hard” and “soft” security interact and mutually reinforce one 
another illustrates the potential for a comprehensive systemic crisis caused by climate change. The 
latter should be understood as a crisis of interdependency that impacts all aspects of the global 
system, becoming at the same time a political, security, economic and social crisis, both at the micro 
and macro level. By focusing too narrowly on “hard security”, the “Livre Vert” does not sufficiently 
analyse the “soft security” socio-economic impact of environmental degradation, and how the latter 
could exacerbate the risk of civil and inter-state conflict. As a result, the concept of a “green 
defence” as presented represents only half the picture, and should be broadened to include an 
analysis of how the “hard” and “soft” security dimensions of climate change are interconnected.  
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b) How climate change can exacerbate a wide variety of different types of security threats and 
lead to a systemic crisis 
 The “Livre Vert” primarily focuses on how resource scarcity can enhance both civil and inter-
state conflict, or how extreme weather events can cause widespread destruction and mass population 
displacement. However, it does not consider the possibility that environmental degradation may 
aggravate other threats such as terrorism, crime, cyber security and nuclear proliferation. This will be 
the focus of the last section, which will analyse how climate change has the potential to exacerbate a 
wide range of security threats, resulting in a comprehensive systemic crisis.   
 The “Livre Vert” neglects the issue of terrorism. It posits that the latter is an exaggerated 
threat, and that many more people have already died from the effects of climate change than from 
acts of terrorism.155 Moreover, the “Livre Vert” argues that governments have used the possibility of 
weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists as a pretext to further their own 
interests and those of private lobbies. It points to the example of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, 
ostensibly to protect the world from Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction that were 
subsequently never found, whereas Iraqi oil fields were immediately taken under control by the US 
military. This viewpoint stands in sharp contrast to other more conventional policy papers, for 
example the French “Livre Blanc”, the European Security Strategy and especially the American 
National Security Strategy. All three share a common emphasis on seeing terrorism and weapons of 
mass destruction as a primary security threat, especially since the 9-11 terrorist attacks.156  
Moreover, the “Livre Vert” differs from other policy papers on environmental security, many 
of which argue that environmental degradation risks exacerbating the threat of terrorism. For 
example, the 2007 report from the Centre of New American Security on the impact of climate 
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change outlines different ways in which environmental factors might enhance Islamic terrorism.157 
First, the report explains that growing global energy demand, combined with an increasingly tight 
market for fossil fuels, is likely to encourage developed countries to reinforce their involvement in 
the Middle East, which still contains the world’s largest hydrocarbon reserves. This would have the 
effect of further inflaming radical Islamic terrorist movements, who resent what they perceive as 
Western imperialism. Second, water and food scarcity could combine with mass population 
displacement due to rising sea levels and more extreme weather events, triggering domestic upheaval 
and pushing already fragile states to the verge of collapse. The examples of Syria, Iraq and Libya 
illustrate how state failure is highly conducive to the spread of terrorism.158 Third, the 2008 FRIDE 
report on national security and climate change highlights that as the effects of global warming 
worsen in the near future, extremist radical green movements may come to rely on “eco-terrorism”. 
This would involve blowing-up polluting factories or other symbolic gestures to gain public attention 
and put pressure on governments to implement more radical policies to tackle climate change. For 
example, the FRIDE report explains that in the United States: 
The FBI has observed worrying signs of an escalation in violent rhetoric and tactics amongst a small 
minority of environmental extremists, and they currently consider “eco-terrorism” to be one of the 
most serious domestic terrorism threats.159  
The risk that terrorism might be exacerbated by environmental factors illustrates the potential for 
climate change to become a systemic crisis, a possibility not considered by the “Livre Vert”.  
Likewise, the “Livre Vert” also neglects the threat stemming from both domestic and 
international crime. The book focuses on the problem of illegal trafficking in plant and animal 
species, and devotes many pages to outlining strategies for protecting biodiversity.160 While 
undoubtedly significant, the illegal trafficking of plant and animal species represents only a minor 
part of global crime, especially when compared to drugs, weapons, mineral resources and human 																																								 																					
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trafficking. Once more, this stands in sharp contrast to other more conventional policy papers such as 
the French “Livre Blanc”, the European Security Strategy or the American National Security 
Strategy, where crime has always featured as a primary threat.161  
Unlike the “Livre Vert”, other policy papers on environmental security have highlighted the 
risk that environmental degradation may exacerbate both domestic and international crime. For 
example, the 2008 FRIDE report on national security and climate change warns that global warming 
could potentially cause serious internal disruption in both developing and developed countries, 
opening the way for crime.162 In the same way that failed states are conducive to the spread of 
Islamic terrorism, they are also conducive to the proliferation of criminal networks, a notorious 
example being widespread piracy in Somalia. Even if states do not collapse, we have seen how 
climate change is likely to exacerbate poverty worldwide, pushing desperate people to turn to crime 
as the only way to feed themselves and their families. In developed countries, the arrival each year of 
thousands of illegal immigrants, some of whom may turn to petty crime if they fail to integrate, is 
already a significant challenge. This situation could be made much worse by the displacement of 
millions of people due to climate change. Moreover, the breakdown of law and order following 
extreme weather events is also conducive to the spread of crime, as was demonstrated in New 
Orleans following the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina. The risk that domestic and 
international crime might be exacerbated by environmental factors is another example of the 
potential for climate change to become a systemic crisis, a factor not addressed by the “Livre Vert”.  
Cyber security is another significant issue that does not feature prominently in the “Livre 
Vert”. Although cyber defence is mentioned, it occupies only half a page out of a total of 120 pages 
and is not presented as a primary threat in the same way as environmental degradation.163 While 
cyber security issues were similarly neglected for a long time in more conventional policy analyses, 																																								 																					
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this has radically changed over the last decade. For example, the French “Livre Blanc”, the European 
Security Strategy and the American National Security Strategy now all devote many pages to 
outlining ways for enhancing cyber defence mechanisms, now considered a security priority at the 
same level as terrorism.164  
The “Livre Vert” also differs from other policy papers on environmental security, which point 
to the ways in which environmental factors could enhance the risk of cyber-attacks. For example, the 
2013 NIC report on natural resources highlights that modern energy infrastructure is increasingly 
controlled and regulated by digital technology.165 This makes it vulnerable to cyber-attacks, which 
poses a real danger for nuclear and certain renewable energies. There is the prospect of cyber-pirates 
hacking into nuclear power plants or large hydroelectric dams, causing potentially widespread chaos 
and destruction. The potential for environmental factors to exacerbate cyber threats indirectly is 
another example of how climate change risks becoming a systemic crisis, which is not considered by 
the “Livre Vert”. 
In contrast with the three security threats described above, the danger of nuclear proliferation 
is taken seriously by the “Livre Vert”. The book points to the important weaknesses in the global 
nuclear non-proliferation regime and outlines many proposals aimed at strengthening and updating 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This includes, for example, reinforcing 
mechanisms for the international regulation of “nuclear-weapons-free zones” under the aegis of 
United Nations.166 Such a proposal is similar to more conventional policy papers such as the French 
“Livre Blanc”, the European Security Strategy and the American National Security Strategy. The 
latter support greater international oversight and highlight that globalization has enhanced the danger 
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of nuclear proliferation.167 However, the “Livre Vert” is more radical because it supports, over the 
long run, a gradual disarmament of all nuclear arsenals, joining US President Obama’s declared 
objective of “global zero”.168    
Although the “Livre Vert” pays close attention to the threat of nuclear proliferation, it does 
not consider how environmental factors can potentially exacerbate it. This differs from other policy 
papers on environmental security. For example, the 2007 report by the Centre for a New American 
Security explains that several countries such as Israel, Pakistan and India, which are likely to 
experience sharp water scarcity in the coming decades, possess nuclear weapons and may feel forced 
to use them if their water supply reaches a critical level.169 Likewise, several other states that have 
the capacity to develop nuclear weapons, but have made the deliberate choice not to do so, might be 
pushed into acquiring them if they experience dire resource stress linked to climate change. For 
example, while South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons programme at the end of Apartheid, it is 
likely to experience sharp water scarcity in the near future. This could potentially encourage the 
country to resume its nuclear programme if the situation becomes desperate. Under such 
circumstances, there is very little surrounding countries can do to defend themselves against a 
nuclear power intent on securing access to vital resources. Finally, the 2013 FRIDE and Chatham 
House think tank reports underline that sea level rise and the increase of extreme weather events 
stemming from climate change increase the risk that a nuclear power plant may be damaged due to 
flooding. Although the Fukushima nuclear incident had nothing to do with climate change and was 
caused by a tsunami following an earthquake, it is illustrative of the vulnerability of supposedly well-
protected modern nuclear power plants. A strong hurricane or large flood could have similar effects 
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and damage the nuclear reactor, releasing large amounts of radioactive material in the surrounding 
area.170  
4) Conclusion of the second chapter 
 Overall, the risk that environmental degradation might trigger a systemic crisis is two-fold. 
First, climate change represents a crisis of interdependency, as the “hard” and “soft” security 
dimensions are interconnected and mutually reinforcing, with the potential to become at the same 
time a political, security, economic and social crisis, both at the micro and macro level. Second, there 
is the danger that environmental factors could exacerbate a wide range of different types of threats, 
such as terrorism, crime, cyber security and nuclear proliferation. The “Livre Vert” fails to consider 
these risks, because it overly concentrates on the “hard security” dimension. This includes the 
potential for civil and inter-state conflict over dwindling resources, or how extreme weather and sea 
level rise might result in widespread destruction and mass population displacement. While these 
represent significant threats, it is only half of the picture. A much more compelling danger is the fact 
that climate change has the potential to impact virtually all aspects of society, ushering in a 
comprehensive global systemic crisis. As a result, while the security paradigm outlined by the “Livre 
Vert” is insightful, it remains incomplete. The concept of “green defence” should be broadened by 
adopting a holistic approach to environmental security. The third chapter of this thesis will provide a 
comparative analysis of the strategies and policies proposed by the “Livre Vert” for addressing the 
environmental threats and risks outlined in the second chapter. The aim will be to determine how a 
holistic approach to environmental security can also be applied in the context of concrete policies for 
mitigating and adapting to climate change.  
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Chapter III: Strategies for addressing environmental threats and risks  
The third chapter of this thesis will provide a comparative analysis of the strategies proposed 
by the “Livre Vert” for addressing the environmental threats identified in the previous chapter. It will 
attempt to answer the three research questions and test the validity of the second group of 
hypotheses. Are the strategies outlined by the “Livre Vert” comprehensive? Do they fit into any 
conventional political categorization?  Is the strategic paradigm outlined by the “Livre Vert” 
exhaustive enough to address the potential for systemic crisis stemming from future environmental 
challenges? 
 In order to answer the research questions and test the validity of the second group of 
hypotheses, the chapter will be divided into two sections, which will be followed by a conclusion 
recapitulating the findings of the thesis: 
1) The first section will provide a comparative analysis of the strategic paradigm proposed by the 
“Livre Vert” for adapting to climate change. The policies it presents are aimed at absorbing the 
shock stemming from environmental degradation by reinforcing and creating new military and 
governance structures. We will see that the multi-level strategies proposed by the “Livre Vert” 
are often more ambitious than those of other policy papers on the topic.  
2) The second section will broaden the analysis by examining the strengths and weaknesses of “low 
politics” strategies aimed at mitigating or attenuating the impact of environmental degradation. 
This refers to economic and social policies for achieving sustainable development, which are not 
discussed in the “Livre Vert”. This section aims to determine whether or not “low politics” 
strategies of mitigation can be effective when compared to “high politics” strategies of 
adaptation, in order to ascertain whether they should also be included in the strategic framework 
of a “green defence”.  
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1) A comparative analysis of the “high politics” strategies proposed by the “Livre Vert” for 
adapting to the impact of environmental degradation 
 
a) Adapting to climate change by placing environmental security at the heart of military 
strategic planning 
 The “Livre Vert” proposes first of all to place environmental security issues at the heart of 
military planning and defence, as environmental issues are still too often neglected in national 
security and military strategies. For example, it points to the near complete lack of consideration for 
environmental security in the 2013 French “Livre Blanc”, where it occupies only half a page, arguing 
that scientific uncertainties remain about the real impact of climate change.171 This neglect stands in 
contrast with the strategies from other powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom or 
Germany. For example, the 2010 US Quadrennial Defence Review devotes an entire section to 
matters of environmental security.172 Likewise, the US department of Defence has published a 
“Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap” in 2012 to prepare the US military for future environmental 
challenges.173 Thus, the “Livre Vert” underlines that France is lagging behind on environmental 
security, and proposes several strategies that would allow France to become a model for “green 
defence”. France would need to create an institution for dialogue and consultation between the 
defence/military establishment and the environmental party. This could take the form of a ministry 
entirely devoted to environmental security that would be linked to the ministry of defence, a far-
reaching proposal. It also recommends the commissioning of a parliamentary report on how to 
develop and apply the concept of “green defence” in the context of the French military.174      
The “Livre Vert” acknowledges that the concept of environmental security has been 
developing over the last decade, but argues that other analyses do not go far enough. For instance, 
even in countries such as the UK and the US where environmental threats are taken more seriously, 
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they are still often not integrated in military reports and school curricula. The “Livre Vert” proposes 
both to create specialised “green defence” training in military academies, as well as to integrate 
environmental security with international relations university curricula. Moreover, it underlines the 
need to systematically include a clause on environmental security in military reports and policies 
relating to defence more generally.175  
At the European level, the “Livre Vert” underlines that the European Security Strategy still 
does not place environmental security on the same level as issues such as terrorism or cyber security, 
even if more consideration was given in the 2008 update.176 Thus, it proposes the elaboration of a 
“Livre Vert Européen de la Défense”, to be written in collaboration between member states, the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the External Action Service. This would help position 
environmental security at the heart of the EU’s “Common Security and Defence Policy”.177 Such a 
proposal goes much further than suggestions from other policy papers such as the 2008 EU High 
Representative’s Report on security and climate change. The latter simply recommends to “further 
integrate adaptation and resilience to climate change into EU regional strategies”.178 
At the international level, progress has been made with the adoption by the UN General 
Assembly of a resolution in June 2009 explicitly recognising that climate change has security 
implications.179 Nevertheless, the “Livre Vert” argues that environmental security is still not taken 
seriously enough by UN institutions. Many countries continue to consider environmental issues to be 
economic and social matters, and reject the idea of associating them with international security.180 
Hence, the “Livre Vert” recommends that France and other EU member states use their influence 
within the UN system to push for a new resolution by the General Assembly that identifies 																																								 																					
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environmental degradation linked to climate change as one of the main threats facing the 
international community.181   
 
b) Adapting to climate change through greater use of preventive action  
 The “Livre Vert” focuses on preventive action and diplomacy to forestall environmental 
conflicts before they emerge. Like many current policy analyses, it is critical of international 
interventions post-Cold War, underlining that excessive military action has shown its limits.182 It 
relies on the examples of recent interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya to highlight the 
immense difficulties of post conflict reconstruction and stabilization following rapid victory over 
indigenous regimes. All three countries are now prone to internal collapse, and the “Livre Vert” 
points to the enormous human and economic cost of these interventions.183 As a result, it argues for 
more diplomacy and preventive action to resolve the root causes of conflicts before they emerge, 
thus forestalling the need for intervention later on: 
L’action coercitive a montré ses limites (…) (ce qui implique) la nécessité du retour à l’action 
préventive dans le traitement des crises internationales (…) L’élaboration de solutions préventives et 
patientes, moins médiatiques, mais également plus acceptables par l’opinion publique (…) est une 
piste sur laquelle il est impératif d’avancer.184 
This is especially true for environmental threats, whose origins are often linked to conflicts over the 
sharing of a resource, which should be addressed through diplomacy and dialogue. While not naming 
it explicitly, the “Livre Vert” relies on the theory described in the literature review that sees 
cooperation over environmental issues as a potentially key tool for peacebuilding and 
reconciliation.185  
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Many other security strategies such as the 2013 French “Livre Blanc” also share this 
emphasis on the importance of preventive action, since recent international interventions have ended 
up being more problematic than anticipated.186 The example of the United States is illustrative on 
this matter. While the 2003 National Security Strategy under President Bush prioritized military 
intervention, unilaterally if necessary, to defeat the Al Qaeda threat, the 2010 National Security 
Strategy under President Obama puts strong emphasis on preventive action, involving diplomacy and 
multilateral negotiation to resolve crises.187 The main difference with the “Livre Vert” is that 
preventive action is not the strategic priority and the main focus of the 2010 US National Security 
Strategy. It represents one tool amongst others, including military intervention when necessary, that 
governments must use in a balanced way according to the international context.  
The “Livre Vert” outlines several proposals for reinforcing preventive action at the national 
level. First, it recommends strengthening Parliamentary oversight over defence. It criticizes current 
procedures in countries such as France or the United States, where the executive does not need 
Parliamentary approval for launching a military operation abroad. The “Livre Vert” argues that this 
often leads to abuse and lack of transparency, as was the case with the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. 
Stronger Parliamentary supervision over defence would help to contain the risk of unilateral military 
intervention, reinforcing preventive action and diplomacy.188 While this is supported in some 
countries such as the UK or Germany, others such as France and the United States are opposed to 
greater Parliamentary oversight for military interventions. The latter argue that it is likely to 
compromise the efficiency and ultimately the success of military operations because the legislature 
may become bogged down in endless debates.189 Second, the “Livre Vert” proposes to create a 
section entirely devoted to conflict prevention within the ministry for environmental security 
described above that would work in close cooperation with the Ministry of Defence. Once more, this 
goes further than most other security strategies. For example, while the 2013 French “Livre Blanc” 																																								 																					
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mentions the idea of creating an institution for conflict prevention, it points to the potential overlap 
with traditional diplomatic channels.190   
At the European level, the “Livre Vert” recognises that the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) has been active in preventive diplomacy, including for example the central role it played in 
the peaceful secession of Aceh Province from Indonesia between 2004-08. However, it is critical of 
what it considers as insufficient preventive action for environmental crises, arguing that the EU has 
tended to focus instead on diplomacy for high profile tension points such as the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict or Iran’s nuclear programme.191 It proposes to create an office entirely dedicated to 
preventive action for environmental security issues within the EEAS, and relies on the fact that 
preventive action enjoys a strong legal base in the EU Treaties.192 Moreover, as with the national 
level, the “Livre Vert” argues that reinforcing the European Parliament’s powers of oversight over 
EU external relations can strengthen preventive action. For example, it proposes to transform the 
current Sub-Committee on Security and Defence into a full standing committee in the European 
Parliament.193 While other policy papers, such as the EU High Representative’s Report on Security 
and Climate change, also support the reinforcing of preventive action, the strategies it proposes are 
less ambitious. The report simply recommends relying on the existing institutional framework, 
particularly on the High Representative, to engage in international preventive diplomacy on 
environmental crises, rather than creating any new structures.194   
At the international level, the “Livre Vert” welcomes the progress that has been made over 
the last two decades in reinforcing preventive action within the UN system, for example the creation 
in 2005 of a new UN Commission for Peacebuilding and Post-conflict Reconstruction. Nevertheless, 
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it argues that such initiatives are also insufficient because they do not focus enough on issues of 
environmental security. Thus, the “Livre Vert” recommends that France, together with other EU 
member states, submit a resolution to the UN General Assembly for creating new categories under 
international law such as a “State facing acute environmental challenges” or the notion of 
“environmental refuge” to reinforce the legal base for global preventive action.195 Second, it suggests 
the creation of a specialized UN agency on matters of environmental security, particularly for 
climate refugees, that would rely on preventive action to address the root causes of environmental 
problems.196 Once more, such strategies are more ambitious than those proposed by other policy 
papers on the topic. For example, while the 2009 report by the UN Secretary General on climate 
change also proposes to reinforce mechanisms for global preventive diplomacy on environmental 
issues, it proposes to strengthen the existing framework of UN institutions and international law, 
rather than create new institutions.197  
However, it should be noted that the “Livre Vert” does not rule out the use of force as a last 
resort if all other options have failed.198 Preventive action cannot always succeed, and environmental 
degradation and resource scarcity are likely to enhance tensions that may result in civil or inter-state 
conflict, which might in some cases require intervention by the international community (to be 
analysed in more detail below). The main difference between the “Livre Vert” and other policy 
papers is that the strategic focus of “green defence” is on preventive action, whereas it represents just 
one policy option amongst others in the 2013 “Livre Blanc”.          
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c) Adapting to climate change by reinforcing the civilian capacity of the military 
 The “Livre Vert” highlights the need to develop the civilian potential of the military for 
responding to natural disasters, since hard military power will be of little use in dealing with a 
climate change-induced increase in extreme weather events such as hurricanes, floods or droughts. It 
argues that civilian rescue missions by the military offer the most appropriate framework for 
protecting populations from natural disasters. Soldiers are trained and equipped for handling difficult 
weather conditions, and can be rapidly dispatched in large numbers to remote locations.199 Examples 
include international military efforts following Typhoon “Haiyan” that devastated the Philippines in 
November 2013, or the deployment of the Franco-German brigades during the flooding of Saxony 
and Bavaria in June 2013. Not only did they rescue and assist survivors, but they also contributed to 
rebuilding and maintaining order. The “Livre Vert” argues that national militaries must be better 
prepared for an increase in civilian rescue missions both domestically and abroad, when the scale of 
destruction caused by natural disasters has overwhelmed local authorities:  
Le dérèglement climatique (…) appelle une orientation de nos armées vers une capacité renforcée de 
secours et d’assistance (…) Détentrice d’une capacité de déploiement en homes et en matériels 
importante (…) l’armée représente un acteur essentiel dans (…) la réaction face aux catastrophes 
naturelles d’ampleur exceptionnelle. Ces capacités, éprouvées lors de nombreuses interventions 
nationales et internationales, représenteront une part croissante de l’activité de nos soldats.200  
The 2013 French “Livre Blanc” emphasises the importance of civilian missions focused on 
post-conflict reconstruction and peace-keeping, but it does not go into detail on how this could be 
applied in the context of natural disasters.201 By contrast, many other countries have started to 
prepare their military for the type of civilian rescue missions needed to manage environmental crises. 
For example, Germany dedicated “Bundeswehr” units to handle the dire consequences of the 
Hamburg flooding in February 1962. Likewise, the American military has begun training marines to 
intervene and protect populations in areas hit by hurricanes, floods and droughts. The US 
Quadrennial Defense Review explains that:  																																								 																					
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Extreme weather events may lead to increased demands for defense support to civil authorities for 
humanitarian assistance or disaster response both within the United States and overseas.202  
However, the “Livre Vert” posits that these initiatives are insufficient, as was demonstrated 
by the US army’s belated and inadequate response to hurricane Katrina that devastated the city of 
New Orleans in 2006.203 This is because these units are created on an ad-hoc base for temporary 
missions when natural disasters hit the country, and then return to their regular military activities 
after the crisis has abated. By contrast, the “Livre Vert” proposes to create permanent units within 
national militaries entirely dedicated to and specifically trained for civilian rescue missions in areas 
hit by natural disasters, both at home and abroad. It also outlines ways to combine the joint 
deployment of such “green special forces” with other conventional sections of the military, such as 
the air force, navy and ground forces, a strategy which goes further than most other policy papers. It 
explains that an effective response to natural disasters will require joint operations from many 
different sections of the military, each of which can contribute a different but complementary type of 
effort.204 The “Livre Vert” also underlines that current evolutionary trends in many modern 
militaries, which prioritize qualitative advanced technology over the number of soldiers and 
machinery, is not compatible with the needs of a “green defence”. Civilian rescue missions following 
natural disasters do not require advanced missile technologies, but depend on large numbers of 
troops, ships and airplanes, as was demonstrated by the mobilization of over 100 000 soldiers 
following the tsunami that hit Japan in 2011.205        
At the European level, while the “Livre Vert” supports initiatives such as the Disaster 
Preparedness European Community Humanitarian Office (DIPECHO) launched in 1996 to help poor 
countries manage the consequences of natural disasters, it believes the latter does not go far enough. 
This is because DIPECHO relies too much on development aid and does not mobilize the civilian 
potential of the military. The EU is ideally positioned to engage in civilian rescue missions abroad in 
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response to natural disasters, as most of the CSDP’s missions already focus on civilian tasks206. 
Moreover, the legal base for civilian missions in the EU Treaties is strong.207 Thus, the “Livre Vert” 
proposes to rely on this solid base for EU civilian operations and apply it to situations of 
humanitarian assistance following natural disasters. This is similar to the strategies advocated by 
other policy papers such as the report by the EU High Representative on climate change and security, 
which proposes to “further build-up EU (…) capabilities including civil protection and the use of 
crisis management and disaster instruments to contribute to the response to the security risks posed 
by climate change”.208 However, the “Livre Vert” argues that, while EU member states agreed to 
create a rapid reaction force for handling natural disasters by the end of 2014, they decided to 
separate it from the CSDP framework, which is likely to compromise its effectiveness. This is 
because member states are to contribute and manage their own logistical support without a strong 
mechanism to coordinate them. By contrast, the “Livre Vert” proposes to create a rapid reaction 
corps fully integrated into the CSDP and specialized in civilian rescue missions following natural 
disasters, both on the European territory and abroad, fully coordinated and managed by the EEAS.209 
At the international level, the “Livre Vert” suggests the possibility of relying on existing 
principles such as the concepts of “humanitarian intervention” or the “responsibility to protect”, but 
apply them in the context of civilian rescue missions following natural disasters.210 Both notions are 
contentious as they potentially intrude on national sovereignty, which continues to be a pillar of 																																								 																					
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international law. Critics accuse them of hiding the reality of self-interested interventions in pursuit 
of national interests.211 However, civilian rescue missions linked to environmental crises do not 
involve waging war to remove an indigenous regime, but focus on assisting populations, often at the 
express demand of local authorities. The “Livre Vert” implies that international civilian rescue 
operations to help countries suffering from natural disasters should be coordinated by the UN 
General Assembly, and, if the situation is critical, by the Security Council, in conformity with 
international law. Environmental issues are currently the purview of the UN Economic and Social 
Council, and many countries are opposed to extending them to the Security Council, which focuses 
on global security matters.212 Nevertheless, the Security Council has already passed resolutions to 
provide police and military assistance to protect humanitarian assistance efforts following natural 
disasters in places such as Haiti, so the aim would be to reinforce its implication in natural disaster 
relief.213 Once more, this strategy goes further than most other policy papers dealing with 
environmental security, such as the 2009 report by the UN Secretary-General on the topic. While the 
latter does emphasise that the increasing severity of natural disasters will require more coordination 
by the international community for civilian rescue missions, it shies away from proposing any grand 
plan on how to synchronize them through the UN system, and simply encourages countries to 
reinforce channels for dialogue and cooperation.214    
 
d) Adapting to climate change by moving beyond a state-centric view of security  
 The “Livre Vert” advocates the need to move beyond a state-centric conception of security 
and adopt a transnational, possibly even a supranational, strategic framework. While national 
security strategies around the world acknowledge increasing transnational interconnections linked to 																																								 																					
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globalization and the corresponding need to reinforce multilateral governance platforms, they 
continue to consider the nation state as the ultimate strategic priority, especially for matters of 
defence. This is unsurprising, as there is consensus amongst scholars that the nation-state remains 
one of the core elements in the international system, as it has been since the Treaty of Westphalia 
enshrined the concept of national state sovereignty in 1648.215 It might have been expected that 
European countries, having taken part in regional integration, would be less prone to a state-centric 
conception of security. For example, the 2013 French “Livre Blanc” underlines the mutual 
interdependence and solidarity between members of the European Union.216 Nevertheless, it 
continues to assert that the preservation of national independence and sovereignty is one of the main 
strategic priorities: 
Les fondements de la stratégie de défense et de sécurité nationale: A. Préserver notre indépendance 
et notre souveraineté. Attribut essential de la nation, la souveraineté est un fondement de la sécurité 
nationale (…) le maintien de la souveraineté nationale est une responsabilité essentielle du pouvoir 
politique. Il fonde la mission des forces armées (…) L’efficacité des actions engagées à ce titre par 
les forces de défense et de sécurité implique de pouvoir disposer (…) d’une complète indépendance 
de décision et d’action.217  
The “Livre Vert” argues that a state-centric conception of security is increasingly 
inappropriate given the rapidly changing context of world politics in the 21st century. First, it 
highlights that globalization has accelerated over the last few decades, and that the planet is 
becoming a single interdependent community.218 This was underlined in 2008 when the collapse of 
the American subprime market rapidly turned into a global financial crisis. The increasing pace of 
globalization, with enhanced transnational movements of people, goods, capital, ideas and 
knowledge, is both a source of opportunity as well the origin of new transnational security threats 
and risks. This renders a state-centric conception of security increasingly inappropriate for 
addressing new threats stemming from global interdependence. For example, the “Livre Vert” 
underlines that climate change is a quintessentially global threat, as increasing temperatures, 																																								 																					
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greenhouse gas emissions, or sea level rise do not stop at national boundaries.219 While scientists 
underline that the impact of climate change will vary from region to region, there is growing 
consensus that all nations around the world will suffer from its effects. Thus, any concerted attempt 
to effectively address future environmental challenges must concentrate on solutions at the regional 
and global level, in addition to solutions at the national and local levels. 
This viewpoint is similar to the analyses proposed by both the UN and the EU, as they 
represent international and regional organizations. While they are more cautious in their rhetoric, 
both the European Security Strategy and the UN Secretary-General’s report on environmental 
security agree that the changing nature of world politics in the 21st century makes it necessary to 
move beyond a state-centric conception of security. They also concur that only a transnational 
strategic framework offers any hope for successfully addressing new challenges linked to 
globalization and climate change.220      
 
e) Adapting to climate change by strengthening regional integration  
 Due to its emphasis on the need to move beyond a state-centric conception of security, the 
“Livre Vert” supports the strengthening of regional integration, particularly on matters of defence. It 
welcomes the progress that has been made in Europe since the Maastricht Treaty in creating the EU’s 
“Common Foreign and Security Policy” (CFSP) as well as the “Common Security and Defence 
Policy” (CSDP). The Lisbon Treaty in particular is supposed to have strengthened the EU’s cohesion 
as an international actor with four significant innovations: a Permanent European Council President, 
a new High Representative for Foreign Policy, the creation of the “European External Action 
Service”, and the legal enshrining of the “mutual assistance and solidarity” clauses.221 Moreover, 
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external relations have been explicitly defined as a Union competence for the first time, reinforcing 
its standing under EU law where it was previously subordinated to other Community policies.222  
Nevertheless, the “Livre Vert” agrees with the 2013 “Livre Blanc” and the European Security 
Strategy that the current framework for EU external relations should be reinforced. While several 
new institutional mechanisms have been created by subsequent treaties, the CSDP continues to rely 
on the so-called “Petersberg tasks” agreed to in 1992. Although the Lisbon Treaty expanded the 
range of possible missions, the “Livre Vert” argues that the “Petersberg tasks” remain “minimalist” 
and are inadequate, since they are mostly based on humanitarian and “soft security” tasks.223 It 
underlines that reinforcing EU integration for external relations is becoming urgent since Europe is 
surrounded by several unstable regions. These include North Africa and the Middle East, which have 
been seriously destabilised by the Arab Spring, and also Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, with 
Russian interventionism in Georgia and the Ukraine. Both situations have highlighted the inadequacy 
of the EU’s current structure for foreign policy, because it was only able to offer civilian “soft 
security” assistance. This led large member states such as France, the UK, Germany or Poland to 
assume core military and diplomatic responsibilities instead.       
The “Livre Vert” also emphasises that Europe’s neighbours in North Africa, the Middle East 
and Central Asia are likely to be amongst the regions of the world most exposed to climate change, 
with the risk of major environmental crises in the near future right on Europe’s borders.224 While not 
sharing the same degree of concern for environmental problems, both the 2013 “Livre Blanc” and the 
European Security Strategy agree that the changing context of world politics in the 21st century, with 
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new challenges stemming from globalization, renders it imperative to reinforce Europe’s cohesion on 
the international stage. The “Livre Blanc” also concurs that Europe is surrounded by some unstable 
regions, which poses a security threat that should be met by reinforcing cooperation for foreign and 
defence policy, moving beyond the “Petersberg tasks”.225  
As a result, many of the “Livre Vert’s” proposals for reinforcing the CSDP are mirrored in 
other policy papers, particularly the 2013 French “Livre Blanc”. For example, both underline that 
France, as the principal military power in continental Europe, should lead efforts to reinforce 
European defence cooperation. This could start with the strengthening of defence partnership 
agreements such as the Lancaster House Treaties (2010) between France and United Kingdom, or the 
so-called “Weimar triangle” between France, Germany and Poland, recently extended to Spain and 
Italy.226 This core group of countries could initiate enhanced cooperation in the management of 
logistical means for transport and refuelling for air and sea, the buying of military equipment, and 
establish common training centres for soldiers. Such initiatives could then be integrated into the 
CSDP, expanding into new areas such as a common maritime surveillance policy, closer 
coordination of air defence and space policies (the EU’s Galileo satellite programme), and greater 
cooperation on cyber security.227 Both the “Livre Blanc” and the “Livre Vert” also agree on the need 
to reinforce institutions such as the European External Action Service or the European Defence 
Agency, as well as strengthen coordination mechanisms between them to enhance cohesion for EU 
external relations. Finally, they also share the view that common EU defence structures must be 
supported by more integration of European industries and markets for security and military 
equipment, in order to guarantee technological and strategic autonomy.228    
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The fundamental point of disagreement between the “Livre Vert” and other policy papers on 
EU defence relates to the degree of integration that is required. Both the European Security Strategy 
and the 2013 French “Livre Blanc” emphasise that, while more cooperation is needed, it must 
continue to be based on intergovernmental mechanisms. They advocate a gradual step by step 
reinforcement of cooperative structures, which can be realized within the existing framework of EU 
Treaties.229 The “Livre Vert” sharply disagrees, and argues that the framework for EU external 
relations is weak precisely because it continues to rely exclusively on intergovernmental cooperation 
and unanimity in the European Council.230 It underlines that the changing nature of world politics in 
the 21st century means that only a federal European Union has the capacity to assert a strong voice on 
the world stage. Environmental threats linked to climate change render it urgent to engage in a 
“federal leap forward”.231  
The “Livre Vert” argues that individual member states will not have the capacity to handle on 
their own the potentially devastating effects of global warming. Only Europe as a whole has enough 
weight and sufficient resources both to protect itself and play a major role in international 
environmental politics. The EU is still widely considered to be a leading force in this area, as it was 
instrumental in pushing through the ratification and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, so far the 
most ambitious attempt ever made to cut global greenhouse gas emissions. However, the “Livre 
Vert” underlines that bolder action will be needed if the worst effects of climate change are to be 
avoided. This will be difficult to achieve as long as the EU continues to be bogged down by internal 
divisions stemming from the need to achieve unanimity. This was lethal for the EU during the 2009 
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world summit at Copenhagen, where it was largely bypassed and ignored by other powers such as 
the United States and China.232  
The “Livre Vert” outlines far-reaching proposals to create a federal European defence 
structure, the first step in the establishment of a federal European Union.233 It believes the project of 
an EU “green defence” can help to infuse a new dynamic for European integration and provide a 
springboard for a “federal leap forward”. First, it recommends reinforcing the powers of the High 
Representative by turning the position into a federal European minister of external relations. This 
would involve the transformation of the European External Action Service into a federal European 
ministry of foreign affairs and defence, placed above national ministries and with the power to set 
the agenda for the EU as a whole.234 Second, it proposes the creation of a federal European army 
under the authority of the EEAS, merging all national militaries into a single unit capable of being 
deployed in operations around the world. Third, the “Livre Vert” argues that the possession by two 
EU member states of an independent military nuclear capacity is incompatible with a federal 
European defence, and implies that France should extend its nuclear shield to cover the entire 
territory of the European Union.235 The “Livre Vert” acknowledges it will be very difficult to 
convince EU member states to agree on such far-reaching transfers of national sovereignty. This is 
because foreign and defence policy is a core sovereign power, and European countries have up until 
now been very sensitive about preserving it. Indeed, other policy papers such as the 2013 “Livre 
Blanc” and the European Security Strategy insist that any federal integration in the area of external 
relations remains utopic. They argue that the only way forward lies in a pragmatic, step by step 
reinforcing of intergovernmental cooperation.236  
Another controversial element in the “Livre Vert” is its position on the relationship between 
NATO and a reinforced CSDP. It argues that the strengthening of a common European defence is not 																																								 																					
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compatible with the integrated command structure of NATO, where the United States enjoys a 
dominant influence. More than twenty years after the ending of the Cold War, the “Livre Vert” 
believes the rationale for NATO’s continued existence is questionable.237 This is especially true now 
that President Obama has enhanced the strategic pivot towards East Asia begun by his predecessors, 
and is gradually disengaging from Europe. Moreover, given that the crisis between Cyprus and 
Turkey is still ongoing, there remains a tension between Cyprus’ membership in the EU and 
Turkey’s membership of NATO. This implies the need to enhance the distinction between the two 
alliance systems.238 For all these reasons, the “Livre Vert” emphasises that it is now time for 
European countries to assume their own defence independently from the United States. It supports 
the creation of a strong EU defence structure outside of NATO, and appears to suggest the latter 
would gradually wither away under such circumstances. This argument coincides with the views of 
several neo-realist scholars such as Kenneth Waltz, who also believed that NATO would not survive 
the ending of the Cold War, which had provided the rationale for its existence.239  
However, this sharply differs from the position of most official policy papers. For instance, 
both the 2013 French “Livre Blanc” and the European Security Strategy continue to see NATO as 
the pillar of Europe’s security.240 They devote many pages justifying how a stronger EU defence 
structure is perfectly compatible with continued NATO membership, and that both are mutually 
reinforcing. This is because NATO can provide essential equipment, expertise and military bases to 
support the CSDP, while a more integrated European defence pillar would strengthen NATO as a 
whole. Likewise, most scholars from the neo-liberal school of international relations, such as 
Lepgold, agree that NATO can survive both the end of the Cold War and a reinforced European 
defence structure, since the Western Alliance is founded on common values and interests.241 
However, this depends on whether or not EU external relations continue to be based on 
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intergovernmental cooperation. If the EU does one day engage in the “federal leap forward” 
supported by the “Livre Vert”, it is difficult to imagine how this would be compatible with NATO’s 
existence under its current form. There would have to be a change from a multilateral to a bilateral 
alliance system between two powers of more or less equal strength. This would position the EU and 
the US on a more equal footing within the Western alliance, which implies that the United States 
would lose its current dominant position. The latter may not agree to this since, up until now, 
American support for greater European military self-reliance has been conditional on the so-called 
“three D’s”: “no discrimination against non-EU NATO members, no decoupling of European and 
North American security, and no duplication of NATO’s operational planning system or its 
command structure”.242   
 
f) Adapting to climate change by reinforcing global governance  
 The “Livre Vert” underlines that regional integration in matters of defence and foreign policy, 
while essential, will not be sufficient on its own. Since climate change is a truly global threat, the 
strengthening of regional institutions is a first step, which then needs to be combined with the 
reinforcing of global governance within the UN framework. Only through a concerted effort from the 
international community as a whole can there be any hope of finding lasting solutions to global 
environmental problems. There is widespread consensus amongst both policy makers and academia 
that the UN remains, despite its flaws, the only legitimate framework for global governance. The 
“Livre Vert” is in agreement, as the UN includes 193 member states, representing the quasi totality 
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of the world population, with only eleven states not being full members because their sovereignty is 
contested.243  
Despite its legitimacy, the “Livre Vert” highlights that the current UN system of global 
governance is insufficient. Again, such views coincide with a widespread consensus that while the 
UN has had some successes, the current institutional framework is in urgent need of reform. Much of 
the criticism has been focused on the permanent membership of the Security Council, often accused 
of being anachronistic. The “Livre Vert” denounces the fact that it is composed of the five winners 
from WWII and has failed, more than seventy years after the war has ended, to integrate Germany 
and Japan.244 More importantly, it has yet to include new rising powers such as Brazil, India or South 
Africa, which will become increasingly problematic as their economies continue to grow, perhaps 
one day surpassing Western nations such as France and the UK that enjoy permanent membership. 
There is also a need to make the Security Council representative of all regions in the world, as 
currently there are no permanent members from Africa, Latin America or the Middle East. As a 
result, the “Livre Vert” recommends an increase in the number of permanent seats in the UN 
Security Council to include new members such as Germany, Japan, India or Brazil. This would make 
the institution more legitimate and representative of the changing balance of global power.245 The 
idea of reforming the Security Council is not new, and has been discussed by the international 
community for decades. It is supported by many countries around the world, including France. For 
example, the 2013 French “Livre Blanc” proposes to include new permanent members such as 
Germany or Brazil.246 Likewise, the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan attempted to include 
six new permanent members as part of his comprehensive reform of the UN system in 2005.247 The 
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real originality of the “Livre Vert’s” recommendations for reinforcing global governance lies in its 
proposed reforms over the medium and long run, which are far more ambitious and far reaching.  
 The “Livre Vert” underlines that as environmental threats become more acute over the next 
few decades, the Security Council will increasingly have to manage global security crises involving 
civil and inter-state conflicts over scarce resources, which might require UN peace-keeping 
operations. While the Security Council held its first debate on environmental security on the 17th of 
April 2007, this remains an exceptional occurrence. The “Livre Vert” emphasises the need to 
institutionalise more regular debates on environmental security within the Security Council. This is 
also one of the reasons why enlarging the institution’s permanent membership is so important. 
Powerful countries that are not included are likely to become reluctant in contributing to 
international efforts for tackling global environmental crises, and a concerted effort by all of the 
world’s main powers will be needed in order to succeed. This strategy is much more ambitious than 
most other policy papers, such as the 2009 report by the UN Secretary-General on climate change 
and security. While the latter agrees that environmental security issues should be taken more 
seriously by UN institutions, the report simply recommends holding more regular debates within the 
General Assembly on this matter, and certainly not extending them to the Security Council.248  
   Furthermore, the “Livre Vert” argues that the UN system of global governance, similarly to 
the EU’s structure for external relations, is inadequate because it relies on intergovernmental 
decision-making, which tends to paralyze it.249 Even if the General Assembly votes by majority, its 
resolutions are not binding and amount to little more than recommendations, as there is no coercive 
mechanism to enforce them. Moreover, although resolutions from the Security Council are binding, 
the latter often become prisoner of the power politics strategies among its five permanent members, 
who tend to veto resolutions that go against their national interests. Consequently, it has proven very 
difficult for the UN system to have any meaningful impact on global environmental challenges. The 
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UN has relied on periodic world summits to negotiate international agreements for cutting 
greenhouse gas emissions, which have consistently yielded minimalist results. Likewise, the UN 
stood by and was powerless to prevent Russia from planting its flag on the North Pole in August 
2007, since President Putin threatened to use his veto on any Security Council resolution. This seems 
to highlight the incapacity of the UN system as is exists today to effectively protect the global 
commons from intrusion and exploitation by powerful countries. 
For all these reasons, the “Livre Vert” argues that bold and radical action will be needed to 
strengthen global governance. First, the powers of the UN General Assembly must be reinforced, so 
that its resolutions can be binding and amount to more than mere recommendations.250 Given the 
near universality of the institution, it has the potential to become a genuine global governance forum. 
The “Livre Vert” implies this could be achieved by reinforcing the institutional framework of 
international law, where the international court of justice would be responsible for enforcing UN 
resolutions.251 Countries and individuals which do not abide by international agreements to protect 
the global commons or cut emissions would be sanctioned and have to pay fines, much like current 
mechanisms in the World Trade Organization. While the “Livre Vert” does not say so explicitly, it 
also appears to suggest that, as a last resort, the UN Security Council would pass a resolution to 
intervene militarily and stop a country from violating the global commons. There would need to be a 
gradual shift from unanimity to majority voting in the Security Council, putting an end the perennial 
obstacle of the veto system.  
The problem is that the “Livre Vert” is not very clear about exactly how this type of quasi-
federal global governance is ever to be achieved, and it can easily be dismissed as wishful thinking 
and idealism. Indeed, such proposals are far more radical than those of other more conventional 
analyses. While there is broad agreement that current mechanisms of global governance are 
inadequate, most official policy papers simply recommend reinforcing existing multilateral policy 																																								 																					
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platforms such as the G-7 or the G-20.252 Others propose more modest reforms of the UN system, 
which could take the form of a specialised unit within the UN Economic and Social Council 
dedicated to matters of environmental security.253 The concept of federal world governance is a 
classic topic that has been analysed by prominent philosophers such as Immanuel Kant.254 Although 
it has also been taken-up by some contemporary writers such as Nicholas Hagger, this concept is 
absent from most official policy papers due to its idealism.255       
 
g) Conclusion of the first section  
 Overall, it is apparent from this first section that the strategic paradigm outlined by the “Livre 
Vert” is focused on “high politics” strategies for adapting to future environmental challenges. The 
policies it proposes are aimed at absorbing the shock stemming from environmental degradation by 
reinforcing and creating new military and governance structures. This strategic framework is 
comprehensive in that policies are proposed at the national, European and international levels, both 
over the short and the long run. Moreover, many of the strategies it recommends go much further 
than those found in other policy papers, to such an extent that some parts of the “Livre Vert” can be 
considered as idealistic and utopian. Nevertheless, it is equally clear that the strategic focus is 
narrow. There is no analysis of “low politics” strategies, which includes economic and social policies 
aimed at mitigating the impact of environmental threats. The second section of this chapter will seek 
to determine whether “low politics” strategies of mitigation can represent a viable strategy for 
addressing environmental threats compared to the “high politics” strategies of adaptation described 
above. This will allow us to ascertain whether or not the strategic paradigm of the “Livre Vert” is 
comprehensive, and if the concept of a “green defence” should be broadened to also include “low 
politics” strategies for achieving sustainable development.  																																								 																					
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2) A comparative analysis of “low politics” strategies for achieving sustainable development 
and mitigate the impact of environmental degradation  
 
a) Strategies for mitigating vital resource scarcity (water and food)  
 The “Livre Vert” mentions the great potential of desalination technology, together with the 
development of new agricultural techniques and infrastructure, for addressing the problem of vital 
resource scarcity. However, it does not analyse this in detail, as it concentrates rather on “high 
politics” strategies for adapting to the impact of environmental threats. This stands in contrast to 
many other policy papers on environmental security, which tend to focus more on “low politics” 
strategies for mitigating water and food scarcity with policies of sustainable development. For 
example, the 2012 report by the NIC on global water scarcity underlines that up to 2050, the best 
solutions will involve improving infrastructure, technology and investments.256 First, since 
agriculture represents 70% of global freshwater consumption, reinforcing farming infrastructure and 
making better use of agro-technologies can enhance efficiency and reduce water wastage. This 
includes increasing the availability of existing technologies for water conservation, soil irrigation and 
land levelling (to generate an even distribution of water), which can enhance agricultural yields. The 
NIC report provides the example of the Amu Darya Basin in central Asia, where improving 
agricultural infrastructure in this way “could annually save 2,000 cubic meters of water for each of 
the 4 million hectares of irrigated area, totalling about 8 billion cubic meters throughout the basin” 
and would go a long way towards mitigating the region’s problems of water and food scarcity.257 
Another promising strategy involves investing in research to develop new technologies that 
would reduce the amount of water needed for agriculture, thereby enhancing food yields. For 
example, the NIC report on water security points to recent technological advances in large-scale 
“drip irrigation” techniques, which have helped to save substantial quantities of both water and 
fertilizer. It relies on a complex system of pipes, emitters and valves that make water drip slowly to 																																								 																					
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		 88	
reach the plant’s roots.258 New versions of this technology have sharply reduced the cost, making it 
available in many arid parts of the world such as Mexico and Israel, where it has helped enhance 
food yields without endangering tight water supplies.  
Likewise, the 2012 NIC report on Natural Resources highlights that, while controversial, the 
development of genetically modified foods represents another auspicious strategy for mitigating vital 
resource scarcity.259 Advances in genetic engineering have made it possible to modify specific 
aspects of the DNA in plant organisms, enhancing their size, lifespan, nutritious content and 
resistance to pathogens and insects, as well as reducing the amount of time and effort needed to grow 
them. New versions of this technology have helped cut the cost, making genetically modified foods 
affordable in many developing countries suffering from food scarcity. For instance, the PG 
Economics Ltd, a private British company that provides advisory and consultancy services on 
agriculture, believes that:  
GM technology has had a significant positive impact on farm income derived from a combination of 
enhanced productivity and efficiency gains. In 2010, the direct global farm income benefit from 
biotech crops was $14 billion. This is equivalent to having added 4.3% to the value of global 
production of the four main crops of soybeans, maize, canola and cotton. Since 1996, farm incomes 
have increased by $78.4 billion.260  
Moreover, recent technological breakthroughs have raised the prospect of developing drought 
resistant crops or grow plants that are resistant to salt or waste water, which would require half the 
amount of water used by an ordinary crop.261  
The “Livre Vert”, together with the EELV party and many other environmental movements 
across the world, have questioned the viability of genetically modified organisms as a strategy for 
mitigating vital resource scarcity. They warn about the impact genetically modified foods could have 
on human health.262 While there is yet no scientific consensus on the matter, there may be a risk that 
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genetically modified plants produce on their own enhanced amounts of herbicides, pesticides and in 
some cases antibiotics, which are then digested by humans when eating derived food products. 
Moreover, the widespread growing of genetically modified crops has contributed to making certain 
types of weeds, insects and bacteria resistant to herbicides, pesticides and antibiotics, forcing farmers 
to double the quantities of chemical products used in agriculture. This has raised further concerns 
about the potential impact on human health, as well as the damage caused to the environment.  
However, in some countries such as China, the largest increase in water consumption comes 
not from agriculture, but from industry and domestic use linked to strong economic and demographic 
growth. The 2012 NIC report on global water security underlines that this requires investing in other 
types of technologies and infrastructure that focus on improving economic efficiency as well as the 
quality of drinking water.263 For example, engineering solutions, such as diverting rivers from their 
natural course or transferring water between them, would help to mitigate growing water scarcity in 
urban areas. This strategy relies on a “diversion dam” that diverts water through artificial canals to 
the desired location, mostly large city reservoirs or hydroelectric power plants. The “Hoover Dam” 
for example, built in 1936 to divert the Colorado River, continues to fill up Lake Mead, the largest 
water reservoir in the United States by volume, providing water for millions of people and irrigating 
hundreds of thousands of acre of land to support agriculture across the region.264 However, the 
“Livre Vert” underlines that engineering solutions have become controversial because they tend to 
uproot local populations and force them to resettle elsewhere, as well as damage the environment by 
destroying local ecosystems. Thus, unlike many other policy papers that tend to see engineering 
solutions as a panacea, the “Livre Vert” explains that the benefits must be balanced against the costs 
in order to determine whether or not it represents a viable strategy for addressing vital resource 
scarcity.  
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Probably one of the best hopes for meeting future growth in water demand for domestic 
consumption would be to improve desalination and water purification techniques. The International 
Desalination Association estimated in 2011 that there were 15.988 desalination plants operating 
around the world, which purified 66.5 million cubic meters of water per day for a total of 300 million 
people. It predicts this figure to increase up to 120 cubic meters of water by 2020, of which 40 
million cubic meters would come from the Middle East.265 Already, many Middle Eastern countries 
are investing in desalination technology as a key strategy to mitigate the impact of water scarcity and 
climate change. The world’s largest desalination plant (“Jebel Ali”) is located in Dubai, and Israel 
currently obtains about 50% of its domestic water from desalinated seawater. The main drawback is 
that desalination requires large amounts of energy, which tends to make it expensive. Thus, many 
developing countries that need it most are often not able to afford it, even if technological 
breakthroughs are gradually reducing costs. Investing in research to develop new technologies to 
make desalination more affordable could become a prime mechanism for mitigating water scarcity in 
countries facing a surplus of salt water due to sea level rise. 
One of the main challenges in addressing vital resource scarcity is that poor countries in 
regions such as Africa or the Middle East are already suffering disproportionately from its effects, 
and climate change combined with uncontrolled demographic growth is likely to exacerbate this 
situation. Many under-developed countries simply cannot afford investments in new technologies 
and infrastructure that would help to mitigate water and food shortages. The World Bank suggests 
that one solution could be for rich countries to increase financial aid for poor countries, as well as 
reinforce control mechanisms to ensure that the money is not diverted by corrupt local officials. Such 
foreign assistance may well become essential, since the World Bank estimates that even if 
developing countries manage to reinforce infrastructure, they would still require foreign aid of up to 
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20 billion dollars by 2020 just to reach the UN Millennium Development Goals on basic access to 
water and sanitation.266  
Likewise, the 2012 NIC report on global water security projects that the “investment 
shortfall” needed for developing countries to boost agricultural yields and meet growing food 
demand could amount to 90 billion dollars by 2020.267 The report also proposes to partly privatize 
water services and liberalize agriculture in order to attract foreign investment that would help fund 
new infrastructure and technologies. However, it warns that such privatisation must be accompanied 
by government supervision, otherwise abuse by self-interested multinational corporations at the 
expense of local populations would become a real threat.268 Furthermore, the World Economic 
Forum has provided another original strategy, which involves trading products with high water 
content, so-called “virtual water”. The 2012 NIC report on global water security underlines that:  
Although water is not a commodity that is directly traded on the open market, it is vital in the 
production of food and other commodities that are traded globally. Global commodity prices 
incorporate the value of water and other resource inputs used in production.269  
 
Already, countries in North Africa and the Middle East have succeeded in partially offsetting their 
water shortages through the purchase of vast amounts of food commodities with high virtual water 
content, equivalent to the entire Nile River.270 For example, over the period from 1996 to 2005, 
Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen had a net virtual water import higher than 50 billion cubic meters 
per year, one of the highest in the world. The average across the Middle East and North Africa as a 
whole over the same period was between 10 to 15 billion cubic meters per year, far above most other 
regions in the world (except for Japan, Mexico and Western Europe), allowing these countries to 
partially compensate for internal water shortages.271  
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For all these reasons, it is apparent that “low politics” strategies aimed at mitigating the 
impact of vital resource scarcity can be just as effective as the “high politics” strategies of adaptation 
outlined by the “Livre Vert”. Given the range of promising economic and social policies based on 
achieving sustainable development, we can see that the strategic paradigm of the “Livre Vert” is 
incomplete. The focus on preventive action as one of the core elements of a “green defence” opens 
the possibility for expanding and stretching the concept to include “low politics” strategies aimed at 
mitigating resource scarcity. The latter should be combined together with the “high politics” 
strategies of adaptation outlined by the “Livre Vert”, which involve the creation of new military and 
governance structures.   
 
b) Strategies to develop renewable energies for mitigating both primary resource scarcity and 
climate change 
“Low politics” strategies aimed at achieving sustainable development also show great 
potential for mitigating both primary resource scarcity as well as climate change. We have seen in 
the previous chapter that the main problem with fossil fuels is that they are in large part responsible 
for climate change due to greenhouse gas emissions, and that global conventional reserves are 
rapidly drying up. Therefore, what is needed is a new form of energy that does not release 
greenhouse gases, and is abundant and renewable, meaning it can be used over and over again to 
meet the exponential increase of global demand. Most scientists are in agreement that so-called 
“renewable energies” offer the best hope of meeting such requirements and of one day replacing 
fossil fuels as the world’s main energy source. Renewable energies come in many different forms, 
and each type has its benefits and drawbacks. This represents a very important strategy for mitigating 
the impact of both climate change and natural primary resource scarcity.   
The “Livre Vert” analyses the development of renewable energies in the context of “eco-
conception” for the military, which it defines as the ability to reduce dependency on hydrocarbons 
and control the environmental impact of military equipment during all “life-phases”, including the 
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fabrication, usage and dismantling.272 The “Livre Vert” highlights the significant strategic 
vulnerability of military dependence on imported petrol reserves, involving supplies from some of 
the most unstable regions in the world such as the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia. Moreover, 
as the price of petrol continues to increase due the drying up of conventional reserves, the expenses 
involved for drilling in difficult areas, and an increase in global demand, the cost of military 
operations is becoming prohibitive.273 For all those reasons, the “Livre Vert” outlines strategies to 
develop alternative renewable energy sources and generalize “eco-conception” across the military. 
Although France has recently improved the environmental credentials of its military274, it is still 
behind other Western countries such as the United States or the United Kingdom, where the concept 
of “eco-conception” is already at an advanced stage. For example, the 2010 US Quadrennial Defence 
Review contains an entire section outlining a comprehensive strategy for achieving a transition to 
renewable energies in the US military275, which is lacking in the 2013 French “Livre Blanc”. As a 
result, the “Livre Vert” proposes to increase the national budget for military research on renewable 
energies, with the aim of a gradual but complete ecological transition of French defence over the 
next couple of decades. Moreover, it recommends to generalise the concept of a “green passport”, 
already used for certain types of warships, to all sections of the military, as a way of enhancing 
transparency over the environmental credentials of military equipment.276 At the European level, the 
“Livre Vert” proposes to create common environmental norms involving greater use of renewable 
energy for the building, usage and dismantling of military installations that would be regulated by the 
Commission in cooperation with the European Defence Agency.277      
While seemingly comprehensive, closer analysis reveals that the strategies outlined by the 
“Livre Vert” for developing renewable energies are limited compared to those proposed by other 
policy papers. This is because it does not offer any method for extending renewable energy 
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technologies for civilian use across society as a whole. The development of renewable energies is 
only considered in the context of the military, from the perspective of making the armed forces less 
dependent on imported petrol reserves to reduce strategic vulnerability, not from the perspective of 
mitigating the impact of climate change. The “Livre Vert” simply explains that renewable energy 
technologies developed for the military can then be transferred to civilian use, but it does not explain 
how this is to be achieved.278 This fits into the framework of a “green defence” focused on “high 
politics” strategies for adapting to environmental threats, in this case how to adapt the armed forces 
to high prices and scarcity of petrol reserves. However, this differs from most other policy papers on 
energy security, which tend to focus on a detailed analysis of how to develop different types of 
renewable energies for civilian use in order to mitigate the impact of both climate change and 
primary resource scarcity.       
Biofuels represent a type of renewable energy that offers hopeful perspectives for reducing 
the strategic vulnerability of the military, but suffers from drawbacks that limit its widespread 
application for civilian use. It is a form of energy derived from biomass (organisms taken either from 
dead plants or animals) that can be converted into fuel through a chemical or thermal reaction. 
Already, biomass accounts for about 10% of global energy supply, but this is mostly through the 
burning of wood for cooking or heating in the developing world, which results in greenhouse gas 
emissions and health problems. The most popular forms of biofuel are liquid bioethanol and 
biodiesel, which are alcohols derived from the fermentation of crops such as sugarcane or corn, 
animal fats and vegetable oils. The main advantages of liquid biofuels are that they do not emit any 
greenhouse gases and, more importantly, they can rely on the existing global infrastructure for liquid 
fossil fuels. In their pure form, biofuels can be used directly by any vehicle or machine because they 
are a liquid source of energy just like petrol, gasoline and diesel.279 This is why the “Livre Vert” 
argues that biofuels represent one of the most promising strategies for reducing the strategic 
vulnerability of the military on imported petrol, as a way of adapting to growing primary resource 																																								 																					
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scarcity. However, the latter does not analyse how the technology could be applied for civilian use 
with the aim of mitigating climate change.  
Other policy papers on energy security underline that biofuels could allow for a rapid, cheap 
and significant reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions. The International Energy Agency 
(IEA) argues that such a policy would save huge amounts of money needed to develop the 
infrastructure required for other types of renewable energies that cannot rely on existing energy 
systems for liquid fuels. For example, Brazil derived nearly a quarter (23%) of its road transport fuel 
from different types of biofuels in 2009.280 At the same time, the IEA points out that biofuels are not 
a panacea, as there are potentially significant drawbacks to using them on a global scale. Widespread 
use of biofuels would necessitate unsustainable quantities of agricultural produce, either in the form 
of plants or animal fats, which risk competing with food production and exacerbating the problem of 
food scarcity in developing countries. Second, we have seen that agriculture necessitates large 
amounts of water, so mass usage of biofuels risks exacerbating water scarcity. Likewise, the need to 
enhance global agricultural yield would aggravate soil erosion since many crop fields in developing 
countries, already strained due to demographic growth, may not be able to resist a further increase in 
demand.281 Such limitations help to explain why biofuels only account for 3% of global energy 
consumption at present, and are not expected to provide a solution for completely replacing fossil 
fuels. Nevertheless, the IEA expects the global consumption of biofuels to increase in the near future, 
and could provide a useful transition type of energy for mitigating both primary resource scarcity and 
climate change. The IEA’s “Biofuels for Transport” roadmap estimates that biofuels could represent 
up to 27% of global transport fuels by 2050, cutting CO2 emissions by about 2.1 gigatonnes per year 
if produced sustainably.282 Therefore, the IEA recommends that countries with excess supplies of 
food that emit large quantities of greenhouse gases (the situation of many Western countries) should 
invest more in research and adopt policies that support biofuels and make them more competitive. 
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Hydropower represents another type of renewable energy that has great potential for both 
military and civilian application. Hydropower is currently the most widespread type of renewable 
energy worldwide, as it accounts for nearly 20% of global electricity production and supplies energy 
for about 1 billion people in 30 different countries.283 Most of the energy produced is derived from 
large dam projects that rely on the strength of water currents to make turbines turn inside power 
plants. The main advantage of hydropower is that, unlike most other types of renewables, it is a 
competitive source of energy since the cost of generating hydro-electricity is relatively low 
compared to fossil fuels. It is also a more flexible source of energy than other types of renewables, as 
it has a large storage capacity and built-in mechanisms that allow it to rapidly adjust to changing 
electricity demand.284 For all these reasons, the “Livre Vert” underlines that there is great potential 
for relying on hydropower to support the energy requirements of military infrastructure. Moreover, it 
can provide a reliable and cheap source of electricity to recharge batteries for military vehicles that 
use electrical engines, thus reducing the strategic vulnerability linked to dependence on imported oil. 
However, unlike other policy papers on energy security, the “Livre Vert” does not consider how 
hydropower can be used for civilian use in the context of mitigating climate change.  
For instance, the IEA’s “Energy Technology Perspectives 2010 Blue map scenario” 
underlines that the actual generation of hydro-electricity does not emit any greenhouse gas. It 
estimates that as the impact of global warming becomes more acute and governments look for 
alternative sources of energy, hydropower could be relied on to produce up to 6,000 terawatt-hours 
of electricity by 2050, nearly twice as much as current levels.285 However, the IEA’s report also 
highlights that hydropower has become controversial as it involves flooding large areas of land 
above the dam, with negative consequences on local ecosystems and mass population displacement. 
In addition, large dam projects tend to slow down the water current, which can prevent nutrient-rich 
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silt from being deposited further down the river.286 Hydropower may also become increasingly 
compromised in regions hit by dry weather and water scarcity, impacting countries such as Ethiopia, 
which derive a large portion of their energy needs from dams on the Nile River. Nevertheless, the 
IEA underlines that since the impact of climate change is likely to be uneven, some parts of the 
world such as Canada or Russia may end up having excess water supplies due to ice melting and an 
increase in precipitation. Moreover, new technologies are helping to contain some of the negative 
environmental and social side effects of large dam projects. As a result, the IEA recommends that 
countries not suffering from water scarcity should invest in developing hydropower as long as 
sufficient precautions are taken.287   
Solar power is a type of renewable energy that has great potential but which currently suffers 
from technological drawbacks that limit its widespread application. The sun produces an enormous 
quantity of energy through thermonuclear fusion that is dispersed across the solar system via solar 
radiation. While approximately half of all solar radiation is reflected back into space by various 
elements in the atmosphere, the other half reaches the Earth’s surface and can be used for energy 
through two main methods. The first one, dubbed “concentrating solar power” (CPS), captures the 
Sun’s radiation using parabolic mirrors to concentrate solar energy and generate hot liquids, which 
then drive turbines to generate electricity. The second method, known as “solar photovoltaic”, 
consists in absorbing sunrays with solar panels to generate electrons inside it, which produces an 
electrical current. The main advantage of solar energy is that it is potentially unlimited and totally 
renewable, since the Sun is expected to continue shining for another one billion years. The main 
drawback is that there is still no technology for storing solar energy, which means that it must be 
used immediately otherwise it is lost and wasted. This makes it an intermittent energy dependent on 
the weather, useful only in parts of the world that are sunny most of the year.288 As a result, the 
“Livre Vert” argues that for the time being, solar energy does not represent a viable policy for 
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enhancing the strategic autonomy of the military. This is especially true in countries with temperate 
climates, where lack of sunshine could seriously compromise national defence capabilities.  
Nevertheless, other policy papers argue that there is great potential for mitigating climate 
change and primary resource scarcity by developing solar power for civilian use in parts of the world 
where the climate is propitious. Solar power does not emit any greenhouse gases; given that it is 
virtually unlimited, it has the potential to support humanity’s energy demands for a very long time, 
no matter how much the world grows demographically or economically. The IEA underlines that in 
places such as low latitude deserts with very few cloudy days per year, solar technologies can 
become cost-effective, despite current drawbacks. For instance, during the period from 2000 up to 
2011, solar photovoltaic became the fastest growing renewable energy source worldwide, driven by 
countries such as Spain and Italy that relied on the Mediterranean climate.289 According to the IEA’s 
“Solar Energy Perspectives” report, in a best-case scenario, solar power could generate up to one 
third of global energy consumption by 2060.290 However, the report underlines that this is dependent 
on achieving a technological breakthrough that would allow solar energy to be stored, making it 
adaptable to changing demand and weather conditions. At present, a significant drawback is that 
solar power is only 17% efficient, which makes it less competitive than fossil fuels that are usually 
between 30 and 50% efficient. Moreover, solar panels are often made out of silicon, an expensive 
material that makes solar energy unaffordable for many developing countries.  
Wind power is the last type of renewable energy that will be considered, and it shares many 
similitudes with solar energy. For example, both wind and solar power are totally renewable and 
potentially immense sources of energy, with some studies predicting that wind power could support 
up to five times current global energy consumption.291 Electricity is generated through the turning of 
turbines with the blowing of the wind, similarly to the mechanism of a windmill. The energy that is 
created depends on the size of the turbine, so a viable strategy is to build hundreds of large turbines 
next to one another into a so-called “wind farm”. The main drawback is that, like solar power, there 																																								 																					
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is still no technology to store wind power, thus the energy is intermittent and prone to waste. It is 
dependent on weather patterns, with some parts of the world enjoying more wind than others.292 As a 
result, the “Livre Vert” underlines that wind power is not an optimal strategy for enhancing the 
strategic autonomy of the military due to intermittency problems linked to climate conditions. 
In contrast, other policy papers have underlined the great potential of civilian wind power 
technology for mitigating both climate change and primary resource scarcity. This is because wind 
turbines do not generate greenhouse gases, and new technologies have helped to significantly cut the 
cost, making it much more competitive than solar power. In regions where there is strong wind, it 
can even rival fossil fuels in terms of cost-effectiveness. The IEA’s “Wind Power Technology 
Roadmap 2013 Edition” underlines that:  
Since 2008, wind power deployment has more than doubled, approaching 300 gigawatts (GW) of 
cumulative installed capacities, led by China (75 GW), the United States (60 GW) and Germany (31 
GW). Wind power now provides 2.5% of global electricity demand – and up to 30% in Denmark, 
20% in Portugal and 18% in Spain.293  
The report estimates that if appropriate measures are taken, wind power could represent between 15 
to 18% of global energy consumption by 2050, a more than six-fold increase from current levels, 
which could avoid 4.8 gigatonnes of CO2 emissions per year. Governments would have to invest 
more in developing offshore wind-farms, since winds are usually stronger at sea, requiring a global 
annual investment of up to 170 billion dollars. There would also need to be much more investment in 
research and development for wind power, which currently only accounts for 2% of global public 
energy research funding.294   
Overall, it is apparent that each type of renewable energy has its strengths and weaknesses, 
both for military and civilian use. Their widespread application is often dependent on financial 
resources, geography and local weather patterns. Therefore, an optimal strategy for mitigating both 
climate change and primary resource scarcity would be to combine different types of renewable 
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energies, depending on local conditions. Today, renewable energies account for about 17% of global 
energy production. The IEA’s 2010 “Energy Technology Perspectives” report estimates that if the 
international community made a concerted effort to invest in renewable energies by following all the 
strategies outlined above, this figure could nearly triple and reach up to 48% of global energy 
production by 2050.295 This would have a very substantial impact in mitigating both climate change 
and primary resource scarcity. The report estimates that global CO2 emissions would be cut by about 
a quarter, depending on what types of fossil fuel technologies it replaces.  
For all these reasons, it is apparent that the strategic paradigm outlined by the “Livre Vert” is 
incomplete. We have seen how “low politics” strategies for mitigating the impact of primary 
resource scarcity and climate change can be just as effective as the “high politics” strategies of 
adaptation outlined by the “Livre Vert”. While achieving strategic autonomy for the armed forces is 
critical, limiting renewable energy technologies to the military does not represent a comprehensive 
strategy. Only by extending them for civilian use across society as a whole can there be any hope of 
substantially cutting greenhouse gas emissions.  
Nevertheless, it is equally clear that none of the renewable energy technologies are yet 
sufficiently developed to completely substitute fossil fuels. Either they are still too expensive to 
become globally competitive, or the energy supply is intermittent and dependent on weather patterns 
because it cannot be stored, and there can also be negative social and environmental side effects. 
Consequently, the IEA’s 2010 “Energy Technology Perspectives” underlines the need to double 
investments in scientific research to hopefully one day achieve technological breakthroughs that 
would make renewable energies a viable strategy for replacing fossil fuels on a global scale.296 
Therefore, the report highlights that at present, the most optimal strategy for mitigating climate 
change and primary resource scarcity is to combine the development of renewable energies with 
other mechanisms for cutting greenhouse gas emissions, which will be analysed in the final section.   
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c) Other types of strategies for cutting greenhouse gas emissions and mitigating the impact of 
climate change 
In the final section of this chapter, we will consider other types of strategies to mitigate the 
impact of climate change, which involve reducing the amount of greenhouse gas emissions from 
current technologies and infrastructure. A controversial alternative strategy involves the development 
of civil nuclear power. This is strongly supported by organizations such as the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) or the World Nuclear Association. The debate between the advantages and 
disadvantages of nuclear energy is not new, but several new technologies have the potential to 
change the equation. First, supporters argue that nuclear fission technology is dependent on primary 
natural resources such as uranium that, unlike fossil fuels, are not undergoing global depletion. At 
current rates of consumption, the Earth’s reserves of uranium are large enough to support global 
nuclear power demand for at least another 200 years, possibly more.297 Second, nuclear fission in 
itself does not generate any greenhouse gases, so it has the potential to make a substantial 
contribution to cutting global greenhouse gas emissions. A country like France derives nearly 75% of 
its electricity from nuclear power298 and represents the 5th largest economy in the world with a 
population of 65 million people, but was only the 18th largest greenhouse gas emitting nation in the 
world in 2010 with 1.15% of global emissions. This is less than a country like Australia ranked 17th 
with 1.19% of global emissions in 2010, but with a population and economy nearly three times 
smaller than France.299  
Third, new technologies have made nuclear energy much cheaper and more efficient than any 
other renewable energy, with 90% efficiency compared to only 17% for solar photovoltaic and 30% 
for wind power.300 More importantly, nuclear energy is not intermittent and dependent on weather 
patterns like many renewables. It can be stored for long periods of time and adapt to changing 																																								 																					
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demand, and a nuclear power plant has a long life span of about 40 years, making it cost-effective 
over the long run. Fourth, several new technologies such as “crystalline compounds (which) can be 
tailored to safely absorb radioactive ions from nuclear waste streams”, are helping to reduce both the 
quantity and the toxicity of radioactive waste generated by nuclear fission, as well as to store it more 
safely.301 The World Nuclear Association argues that new technologies such as so-called “passive 
safety” mechanisms that incorporate as many as three sets of emergency core cooling systems, have 
also significantly improved safety systems within nuclear power plants.302   
The “Livre Vert”, along with the majority of environmental organizations around the world, 
strongly rejects strategies aimed at developing civil nuclear energy in order to mitigate the impact of 
climate change.303 First, they argue that while nuclear fission may not generate greenhouse gases in 
itself, significant amounts of pollution result from mining the uranium, building the nuclear power 
plant and dismantling it once it is out of order. Second, and despite technological improvements, 
nuclear fission continues to generate extremely dangerous nuclear waste material that still emits high 
amounts of radiation for thousands of years. There is growing concern that countries are running out 
of places to store nuclear waste, which is being placed in increasingly hazardous locations. For 
example, the surroundings of Lake Michigan in the United States have become a storage ground for 
the Kewaunee nuclear power plant since 2009.304 Third, the economic benefits of nuclear energy are 
not so clear-cut if one takes into account the huge costs associated with building, maintaining and 
eventually dismantling nuclear power plants. In France for example, there have been contradictory 
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reports about the cost of dismantling and replacing its 58 nuclear power plants by 2060, ranging from 
20 billion euros to as much as 750 billion euros.305  
Fourth and most importantly, the “Livre Vert” strongly argues that despite new technological 
breakthroughs intended to enhance safety, the Fukushima nuclear incident took place only three 
years ago in a supposedly “safe” nuclear power plant in a developed country like Japan. Likewise, 
the global expansion of civil nuclear energy is increasing the threat of proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, since the conversion from civil to military nuclear technology is possible, if challenging. 
For example, many developing countries located in highly unstable parts of the world such as sub-
Saharan Africa are seriously considering investing in civil nuclear technology to meet their growing 
energy needs.306   
While it is opposed to the development of civil nuclear power, the “Livre Vert” strongly 
supports international initiatives for cutting global greenhouse gas emissions. It is particularly 
enthusiastic about the achievements of the Kyoto Protocol, which offered what is so far the most 
ambitious attempt ever made to mitigate the impact of climate change. However, many scientists are 
increasingly concerned that international agreements reached so far are insufficient for avoiding the 
worst effects of global warming.307 As a result, the “Livre Vert” supports the EELV position that 
emphasises the need for France and other EU member states to be more assertive in upcoming 
negotiations during the 2015 world climate summit to be held in Paris.308 Rather than cede to the 
lowest common denominator, as is often the case in climate negotiations, EU countries must push for 
more ambitious and legally binding targets for all the world’s main polluters. Stronger global 
enforcement mechanisms must be established, as there is currently no way to sanction countries that 
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do not abide by their commitments to cut emissions. Moreover, instead of being given an opt-out, 
developing countries must now also be legally bound by any global agreement. This is because the 
so-called “BRIC” countries are gradually surpassing Western countries as the largest greenhouse gas 
emitters worldwide.309 Such a policy fits nicely into the “Livre Vert’s” emphasis on “high politics” 
strategies for creating new global governance structures to address environmental threats. 
Nevertheless, due to its neglect of “low politics” strategies, the “Livre Vert” does not analyse how 
such cuts in greenhouse gas emissions are to be achieved in practice.  
By contrast, many other policy papers have focused on a detailed analysis of how to cut 
greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate the impact of climate change without significantly modifying 
the existing fossil fuel infrastructure, thus avoiding a costly transition to renewable or nuclear 
energy. For example, the 2007 IPCC report on climate change points out that there are natural 
mechanisms which rely on the photosynthesis from plants to absorb CO2 from the atmosphere, a 
process known as “bio-sequestration”.310 Deforestation, which involves the cutting down of trees and 
the clearing of forests to sell the wood or make way for agricultural land, has become a major 
concern for environmental movements around the world. Each year, as much as 12 to 15 million 
hectares of forest are lost, representing the equivalent of 36 football fields per minute.311 The IPCC 
estimates that deforestation accounts on its own for at least 20% of all global greenhouse gas 
emissions, more than the total for all transport emissions, because it interrupts the natural process of 
bio-sequestration.312 As a result, the “Coalition for Rainforest Nations” recommends urgent measures 
to slow down global deforestation, as well as global re-forestation in order to absorb CO2 from the 
atmosphere and mitigate climate change.313 For example, China has created the largest human-made 
forest in the world, supposed to halt desertification and absorb up to a quarter of China’s huge CO2 
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emissions.314 Known as the “Great Green Wall”, the Communist Party aims to extend it further to 
cover 400 million hectares or 42% of China’s landmass by 2050, even though some scientists have 
begun to express doubts about its ultimate effectiveness.315  
There are also artificial ways of reducing greenhouse gas emissions from current fossil fuel 
infrastructure that rely on carbon capture and storage (CCS) mechanisms. The idea is to capture CO2 
emissions at large point sources before they diffuse into the air. The CO2 is then removed to a 
storage site, mostly in underground geological formations. The IPCC estimates that CCS technology 
has the potential to reduce CO2 emissions from large fossil fuel power plants by up to 90%. It 
predicts that CCS could contribute between 10 to 55% of global efforts in cutting greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2100.316 The National Energy Technology Laboratory has pointed out that North 
America alone has enough storage capacity for over 900 years of CO2 at present output rates.317 
Nevertheless, like all other strategies for mitigating climate change, CCS is not a panacea. First, 
similarly to nuclear waste, there are safety concerns about the storing of CO2 waste in underground 
geological formations. For example, a serious incident occurred in 1986 when a massive explosion of 
CO2 stored under Lake Nyos in West Cameroon killed more than 1700 people from asphyxiation in 
a perimeter of 25km.318 Second, the IPCC underlines that the process of capturing and storing CO2 
would increase energy needs by 25% to 40%. While the extra CO2 emissions would be captured and 
stored, global use of CCS risks significantly exacerbating natural primary resource scarcity. More 
importantly, enhanced energy requirements could increase the cost of energy production from 
anywhere between 21 to 91%, making it economically uncompetitive.319 While new technologies 
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have the potential to lower costs in the future, the price is currently prohibitive and prevents the 
widespread global application of CCS. 
One of the best ways of making CCS techniques economically competitive is to rely on 
market tools involving carbon emission trading. The “Livre Vert” strongly supports carbon trading 
schemes, but owing to its neglect of “low politics” strategies based on market management, it does 
not suggest any ways for improving carbon trading, nor does it analyse in detail its potential 
advantages. By contrast, climate experts such as Mark Maslin underline that “the electricity 
produced will always be more expensive if you have to capture and store the carbon emitted, unless 
you can then trade the carbon saved on an international stock market to make a profit.320 Thus, 
carbon trading also represents a viable strategy for reducing the cost of renewable energies and 
making them more competitive.321 Carbon trading relies on exchanging emissions rights between 
either nations or private groups that have agreed on a legally binding overall cap or maximum 
emissions rate. Countries and private groups that pollute less than the overall cap can sell their 
surplus emissions rights to others which are polluting above it. The objective is to decrease overall 
emissions by providing a financial incentive for countries or private groups to pollute less.322  
The first, and so far the only international carbon emission trading system was established by 
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol for developed countries only. In order to meet their reduction targets, 
several countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and, more surprisingly, China since 2012, 
have established their own internal emissions trading systems. However, the largest one was 
launched by the EU in 2005, which became the world’s first and so far only supranational emissions 
trading system.323 While the implementation of the first phase from 2005-7 proved to be highly 
problematic with the collapsing of the price of carbon, the second phase from 2008-12 and the third 
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phase since 2013 have been much more successful. The EU Commission has predicted that: “in 
2020, emissions from sectors covered by the EU ETS will be 21% lower than in 2005. By 2030 (…) 
they would be 43% lower”.324 The European Commission recommends extending the ETS to cover 
new sectors, reinforce and harmonize regulatory mechanisms to ensure that private actors comply 
with obligations to cut emissions, and link it with other comparable systems in other countries 
around the world.325  Nevertheless, carbon trading schemes have been criticized for allowing 
individuals, companies and governments simply to purchase carbon rights in order to meet emission 
targets. Mark Maslin argues that even if it can yield good results, there is no incentive to change 
behaviours and adopt new policies based on achieving sustainable development.326  
 
d) Conclusion of the second section 
Overall, it is apparent that none of the strategies aimed at mitigating the impact of resource 
scarcity or climate change will be wholly effective on its own. Each strategy outlined above has great 
potential, but each one also contains several weaknesses that prevent it from becoming a global 
panacea. The IEA’s 2010 “Energy Technology Perspectives” underlines that an optimal strategy is to 
combine different types of policies for mitigation according to the local context. For example, 
renewable energies are not technologically ready to completely replace fossil fuels, so they must be 
combined with strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, such as CCS mechanisms. However, 
one of the only ways of making the latter economically competitive is to combine it with a market 
for carbon trading. With such an approach, there is great potential for mitigating the impact of 
resource scarcity and climate change. The IEA’s 2010 “Energy Technology Perspectives” estimates 
that if the international community made a concerted effort by investing large sums into all the 
strategies described above, global C02 emissions could be cut in half by 2050. Under this scenario, 
renewable energies would account for 48% of global power generation, civil nuclear energy would 																																								 																					
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provide 24% (up from only 6% today), fossil fuel power plants equipped with CCS would provide 
17% and only 11% would still come from conventional fossil fuel emissions.327 While this may seem 
like an idealistic scenario, the IPCC has underlined that only by halving global CO2 emissions by 
2050 can the worst effects of climate change be successfully mitigated. 
 
3) Conclusion of the third chapter  
The strategic framework outlined in the “Livre Vert” presents us with a paradox. On the one 
hand, the strategies it proposes are comprehensive because they focus on policies at the national, 
European and international level, both over the short and long run. Moreover, many of the strategies 
it recommends go much further and are more ambitious than those found in other policy papers on 
environmental security, to the point that some aspects of the book can be considered idealistic. On 
the other hand, while there are no panaceas, we have seen how the combination of different types of 
“low politics” strategies aimed at mitigating environmental degradation can be just as effective as the 
“high politics” strategies of adaptation outlined by the “Livre Vert”. Given the range of promising 
strategies to achieve sustainable development, it is apparent that the strategic paradigm of the “Livre 
Vert” is incomplete. The concept of a “green defence” should be broadened to include “low politics” 
strategies for mitigating the impact of environmental threats, and combine them together with “high 
politics” strategies of adaptation involving the creation of new military and governance structures. 
The two are compatible and mutually reinforcing since the notion of preventive action, a core 
element in the strategic framework outlined by the “Livre Vert”, opens the possibility to expand the 
concept of a “green defence” to incorporate economic and social policies that address the root causes 
of environmental degradation.  
The idea of a “green defence” as it is presented is unusual and does not fit into any 
conventional political category. It does not correspond to a typical “high politics” perspective, since 																																								 																					
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realist scholars, while sharing the same concern for political and military strategies, have 
traditionally neglected environmental matters, which are not considered to have any bearing on 
national and international security.328 At the same time, however, it does not resemble a standard 
environmental policy analysis, which tends to focus more on “low politics” strategies that rely on 
economic and social tools to achieve sustainable development. Therefore, the strategic paradigm of 
the “Livre Vert” can be seen to represent an unusual hybrid that is best described as a form of “green 
high politics”, an attempt to reconcile and bring together the usually separate fields of defence and 
environmentalism. Such a strategic framework fits into the perspective from which environmental 
threats were analysed in the previous chapter. It should come as no surprise that since the “Livre 
Vert” looks at environmental security from a “hard security” standpoint, underlining the risk of 
conflict, the policies proposed to address this threat rely on “high politics” strategies for reinforcing 
military and governance structures. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that a strategic paradigm focused on 
“green high politics” is comprehensive enough to address the danger of systemic crisis stemming 
from environmental degradation. Only a holistic approach to environmental security that synthesises 
“hard” and “soft” security, “high” and “low” politics strategies, can successfully address the 
systemic risk posed by climate change. This will be analysed in the conclusion of this thesis, which 
will recapitulate the findings and main arguments developed throughout the three chapters in order to 
answer the three research questions.  
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V: Conclusion 
 
We saw in the second chapter that climate change risks becoming a systemic crisis by 
spreading to impact all elements in society. There is a danger it could become a simultaneous 
political, economic, and social crisis, as well as a security and military crisis,	both at the micro and 
macro level. It has the potential to generate both inter-state and civil conflict, exacerbate social 
tensions and inequalities, and damage the economy, possibly costing up to 20% of global GDP each 
year. Climate change represents a crisis of interdependency, given that the “hard” and “soft” security 
dimensions are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. There is also a risk that a wide range of 
threats, such as terrorism, crime, cyber security and nuclear proliferation, will be exacerbated by 
environmental degradation.  
As a result, the potential breadth of threats and risks deriving either directly or indirectly from 
climate change is so substantive that the strategies mobilized to address them must be equally 
comprehensive. This is why the one-sided focus of the “Livre Vert” on “high politics” strategies for 
adapting to environmental degradation is not just incomplete; it is inadequate to successfully address 
the potential for systemic crisis stemming from climate change. At all levels, there is a need to adopt 
a holistic approach by synthesizing “high politics” strategies of adaptation for creating new military 
and governance structures, together with “low politics” strategies of mitigation relying on sustainable 
development. Relying only on one without the other is bound to fail. 
The strategies of adaptation outlined in the “Livre Vert” will help to absorb the shock of 
environmental degradation, but will do little to address its underlying causes. This is because the 
heart of the problem lies in the fact that the Earth’s resources are finite, and that current global 
economic and demographic growth is straining them faster than they can regenerate. The Earth’s 
carrying capacity is gradually being exceeded, as humans deplete both vital and primary natural 
resources. Since the industrial revolution, the capitalist system has relied on fossil fuels to meet an 
ever-growing global energy demand. This is leading to huge quantities of greenhouse gases being 
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emitted into the atmosphere each year, which is warming up the planet at a dangerous pace. The key 
is therefore to find mechanisms to cut greenhouse gas emissions, develop alternative sources of 
energy that are renewable and non-polluting, and rely on sustainable methods for enhancing the 
supply of water and food.  
In the third chapter, we have seen that an optimal strategy is to combine different types of 
policies for achieving sustainable development, depending on local circumstances; this has the 
potential to significantly mitigate the impact of climate change. In order to address the heart of the 
problem, it is essential to develop solar, wind, hydropower and biofuel energies, and combine them 
with desalination and drip irrigation techniques, carbon capture and storage technology, as well as 
carbon trading systems. Such policies are vital for carrying out the ecological transition of society, 
the only way of addressing the root causes of environmental degradation. By relying only on the 
“high politics” strategies outlined in the “Livre Vert”, global environmental problems will continue 
to worsen up to the point where, no matter how much the world adapts by reinforcing military and 
governance structures, it will become impossible to handle the systemic risk posed by climate 
change.   
At the same time, relying only on “low politics” strategies of mitigation is equally 
problematic. This is because even if the international community succeeds in launching far reaching 
policies for achieving sustainable development, most scientists are in agreement that, unless all 
global greenhouse gas emissions are stopped tomorrow, it is already too late to stop the Earth’s 
climate from changing.329 It is too late to prevent the sea level from rising, global temperatures from 
increasing, extreme weather events from becoming more destructive, vital and primary resources 
from becoming scarcer. The question is now one of degree, and that will depend on the extent to 
which countries around the world are able to implement policies for mitigating the impact of 
environmental degradation over the coming decades. Even the most optimistic predictions from the 
IPCC anticipate that it will be extremely difficult for global temperatures to stay below the 2°C 
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threshold over the course of the 21st century. This threshold is considered by most scientists as the 
limit beyond which every person on the planet is likely to suffer, although at varying degrees, from 
the effects of climate change. The best estimates from the 2007 IPCC report predicted global mean 
surface temperatures would rise anywhere between 1.8 °C to 4°C by 2100, with an average at 
2.9°C.330 Climate experts such as Mark Maslin underline that a global warming of this magnitude 
would have very negative consequences on resource supplies, sharply increase the frequency of 
extreme weather events and raise sea levels by as much as 74 cm.331  
However, many leading climate scientists such as Professor Jim Hansen from Columbia 
University have argued that IPCC reports up until now have systematically under-estimated the 
impact of climate change, revising their predictions upward with every new report.332 Thus, the real 
effects of climate change could end up being much worse than current IPCC predictions, especially 
since the latter rely on a linear relation between rising temperatures and the Earth’s climate system. 
There is indeed growing concern within the scientific community that climate change may not occur 
in a linear manner, but that there may be certain thresholds, beyond which it accelerates very fast and 
its impact becomes global, abrupt and irreversible. This is linked to new scientific discoveries, which 
have revealed that many past climatic changes have occurred at a startling pace, with huge changes 
sometimes taking place in less than a decade.333  
As a result, the “high politics” strategies outlined by the “Livre Vert” are likely to become 
increasingly vital to help society adapt to the impact of climate change. Any strategy that relies only 
on mitigation policies will leave the world defenceless against potentially severe environmental risks 
that scientists are increasingly convinced will occur in the not too distant future. By reinforcing 
military and governance structures at all levels, the “Livre Vert” provides a strategy to protect 
society and absorb the shock stemming from environmental degradation. 
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Therefore, the validity of the hypotheses outlined in the introduction is confirmed, and it is 
now possible to conclusively answer the three research questions:  
1) The threats and strategies identified in the “Livre Vert” present a paradox. On the one hand, the 
analysis is comprehensive as it looks in detail at all the main environmental risks and presents them 
as primary threats, underlining how they interact and mutually reinforce one another. It proposes 
policies at the national, European and international level, both over the short run and over the long 
run, which are more ambitious and far reaching than those of most other policy papers. On the other 
hand, the focus of the “Livre Vert” is on matters of “hard security” involving civil or inter-state 
conflict, while neglecting “soft security” or the equally significant economic and social impact. 
Likewise, the “Livre Vert” relies on “high politics” strategies of adaptation involving the creation of 
new military and governance structures, while neglecting “low politics” sustainable development 
strategies for mitigating the impact of climate change. 
2) As a result, the threats and strategies identified by the “Livre Vert” do not fit into any conventional 
categorization. They represent an unusual political undertaking that can be labelled as a form of 
“green hard security” and “green high politics”, an attempt to reconcile the usually separate fields of 
defence and environmentalism.        
3) Nevertheless, a policy paper that focuses primarily on “green hard security” and “green high 
politics” is not comprehensive enough to successfully address the potential for systemic crisis 
resulting from environmental degradation. It must be combined with an analysis of the ways in 
which the “hard” and “soft” security dimensions interact and are mutually reinforcing, issues at the 
heart of the systemic risk posed by climate change. A holistic approach is required, which 
synthesizes “high” and “low” politics strategies. Adaptation and mitigation are indivisible, and can 
be seen to represent two sides of the same coin. Therefore, while the “Livre Vert” provides many 
insightful contributions to the field of environmental security, the analysis is incomplete and 
represents only half of the picture.  
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There is great potential for expanding the concept of a “green defence” by synthesizing the 
two approaches. For example, the focus of the “Livre Vert” on preventive action represents an ideal 
structure to carry out mitigation strategies for achieving sustainable development. We saw in the 
second chapter that the poorest regions in the world, such as sub-Saharan Africa or parts of the 
Middle East, are likely to be the worst hit by future environmental challenges, partly because they 
lack financial means and technical expertise to develop the required infrastructure. The “Livre 
Vert’s” proposal to create institutions dedicated to preventive action at the national, European and 
international level can be mobilized to implement economic and social policies that address the root 
causes of environmental degradation. This can be done through the sharing of technical expertise or 
development aid that would fund infrastructure projects, such as desalination centres, wind farms, 
large hydropower dams, as well as carbon capture and storage mechanisms, helping to mitigate local 
resource scarcity and cut greenhouse gas emissions.         
Another way of synthesizing strategies of adaptation and mitigation would be to rely on the 
civil engineer corps of the military for interventions abroad. Many armies include a corps of officers 
made up of professional engineers, technicians and architects, who are responsible for designing, 
constructing and maintaining military facilities. In the United States, the civil engineer corps is part 
of the US Navy’s “Construction Battalion” that works on the military’s coastal and offshore 
facilities.334 In France, the civil engineer corps is known as the “génie militaire”, and each section of 
the French military has its own “génie” unit. The civil engineer corps could be mobilized to play a 
very important role within the paradigm of a “green defence”. An effective preventive strategy could 
be to dispatch them on civilian missions in parts of the world exposed to environmental tensions in 
order to build sustainable infrastructure where local authorities lack expertise and financial means. In 
countries exposed to water and food scarcity, the civil engineer corps would build drip irrigation 
systems for agriculture and plant new types of crops that are less wasteful and more resistant. 
Likewise, in coastal areas or small islands exposed to sea level rise and extreme weather events, the 																																								 																					
334 Also known as the “Seabees”, this unit was instrumental during WWII, where they assisted the war effort by building 
many military bases, bridges, airstrips and roadways. 
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civil engineer corps would construct higher and stronger dikes, shelters, and help make the local 
infrastructure more resistant and waterproof. The civil engineer corps could teach populations how to 
mitigate and adapt to the various environmental hazards they are exposed to, so that they are 
informed and equipped to protect themselves once the mission is over. 
For all these reasons, it is apparent that environmental security and climate change offer 
strong examples of why the classical distinction between “high” and “low” politics, introduced by 
Morgenthau at the beginning of the Cold War, is becoming inadequate to explain the changing 
context of world politics. EELV’s concern for environmental security is justified, and the topic is 
likely to become increasingly relevant as the impact of global warming accelerates over the coming 
decades. Scientists are concerned that, given that the international community is failing to 
significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions, climate change is bound to become one of the main 
challenges of the 21st century. In such a context, the concept of a “green defence” will become vital 
for allowing countries to manage the impact of environmental degradation.  
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